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THE WOLF ACT AMENDMENTS TO THE
U.S. INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT:
BREAKTHROUGH OR BREAKDOWN?
Robert C. Blitt*
This Article takes a critical look at the major changes brought about
by recent amendments to the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998
(IRFA). The first section briefly traces IRFA’s key features and operation
since its enactment, including an overview of the statute’s institutions and
reporting and sanctioning mechanisms. This section also highlights the
ongoing debate regarding IRFA’s legitimacy and offers a summary of the
major criticisms leveled against the statute, as well as the responses raised
in its defense. With this background in place, the Article turns to an analysis
of the legislative history surrounding the Frank R. Wolf International
Religious Freedom Act (Wolf Act) between 2015 and 2016. This bipartisan
legislative initiative envisioned a wide range of amendments intended to
address some of IRFA’s past shortcomings. Among the changes initially put
forward, IRFA’s narrow focus on states would be expanded to include violent
nonstate actors responsible for violating freedom of religion or belief. In
addition, the original Wolf Act called for boosting the responsibilities and
profile of IRFA’s institutional actors, increasing funding for the promotion
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of international religious freedom activities, mandatory religious freedom
training of State Department officials, and a significant reduction of executive discretion. As a review of this legislative history will demonstrate,
however, many of the changes originally proposed would be either diluted or
altogether deleted, the victims of bad design or competing political interests.
The final content of the Wolf Act as enacted represents an ambivalent renewal
of IRFA’s original promise “to use and implement appropriate tools in the
United States foreign policy apparatus . . . to promote respect for religious
freedom by all governments and peoples.”1 In conclusion, the Article posits
some of this ambivalence may be alleviated or partially remedied based on
how IRFA’s primary institutional actors turn to the task of implementation.
At the same time, securing a more definitive assertion of the central role of
religious freedom in U.S. foreign policy as envisioned in the original Wolf
Act will likely require a renewed, more concerted and committed second
effort by Congress.
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INTRODUCTION
As one of his final acts as president, Barack Obama authorized the first
major overhaul of the International Religious Freedom Act (hereinafter
“IRFA”) since its passage twenty years ago.2 This Article will take a critical
look at the major changes brought about by this overhaul and argue they fail to
fully deliver on the objectives attached to the original effort to amend IRFA.
1

International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, §2(b)(5), 112 Stat.
2787, 2790 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6401).
2
Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 114-281, 130 Stat. 1426,
1426 (2016) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6401).
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Part One of this Article briefly introduces IRFA’s key features and
operation prior to the 2016 amendments, including an overview of the
institutions and reporting and sanctioning system created by the statute. This
section will also highlight the debate over IRFA’s legitimacy and trace the
major criticisms leveled against the statute since its inception, as well as the
responses raised in its defense.
With this background in place, Part Two will review the legislative
history surrounding the Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act
(hereinafter “Wolf Act”) between 2015-2016.3 This bipartisan legislative
initiative envisioned a wide range of amendments intended to strengthen IRFA
and respond to past shortcomings. Among the changes initially put forward,
IRFA would move beyond its narrow focus on states to include scrutiny of
violent nonstate actors responsible for violating freedom of religion or belief. In
addition, the original Wolf Act called for the appointment of a religious freedom
czar within the National Security Council, a significant boost to the profile and
standing of the Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom, and
guaranteed minimum funding and staffing for the Office of International
Religious Freedom and for programs intended to promote international religious
freedom. Further, the bill included mandatory religious freedom training of State
Department officials and a significant reduction in executive discretion, including a new tier system that would authorize automatic designation of certain
countries as Countries of Particular Concern. As this legislative history will
demonstrate, many of the proposed changes would go on to be diluted or
altogether deleted, the victims of bad design or competing political interests.
In assessing the final content of the Wolf Act amendments to IRFA,
this Article takes a middle ground. The changes authorized by Congress afford
IRFA some long-needed basic upgrades and updates. However, many of the
more innovative and forceful original proposals proved too overbroad or
simply too bold to successfully navigate the negotiation process. Ultimately,
what remains of the amendments represents an ambivalent renewal of IRFA’s
original promise “to use and implement appropriate tools in the United States
foreign policy apparatus . . . to promote respect for religious freedom by all
governments and peoples.”4 Some of this ambivalence may be alleviated or
partially remedied by how IRFA’s primary institutional actors opt to implement the various amendments. At the same time, securing a more definitive
assertion of the central role of religious freedom in U.S. foreign policy as
envisioned in the original Wolf Act may require a more concerted and
committed second effort by Congress.
3

Named for the now-retired sponsor of the original 1998 legislation, Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA).
International Religious Freedom Act §2(b)(5), 112 Stat. at 2790 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §
6401).
4
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I. TWENTY YEARS OF IRFA: BRICKBATS AND BOUQUETS
For two decades, monitoring and reporting on international violations
of freedom of thought, conscience and religion or belief has been a formalized
component of the foreign policy of the United States government. This
phenomenon can be traced back to bipartisan passage of the IRFA,5 which
President Bill Clinton signed into law in 1998. Among other things, IRFA
created new institutional actors dedicated to collecting data and advising the
U.S. government on violations of religious freedom in foreign countries. These
actors included an Office on International Religious Freedom (OIRF) and
Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom within the
Department of State, an independent, bipartisan Commission on International
Religious Freedom (USCIRF), and a Special Adviser on International Religious
Freedom within the National Security Council.6
With these new institutions in place, IRFA mandated that OIRF prepare
an annual report containing “detailed information with respect to matters
involving international religious freedom”7 in every foreign country, including:
•
•
•
•

The status of religious freedom;
An “assessment and description of the nature and extent
of violations of religious freedom”;
A “description of United States actions and policies in
support of religious freedom in each foreign country engaging in or tolerating violations of religious freedom”; and
“A description of any binding agreement with a foreign
government entered into by the United States.”8

To undertake this global reporting obligation, IRFA further required
that U.S. missions standardize reporting and “thoroughly investigate reports of
violations of the internationally recognized right to freedom of religion.”9 This
5

See generally, id. The bill passed in the Senate 98-0. Originally introduced in the House of
Representatives as an Act “to establish an Office of Religious Persecution Monitoring.”
Freedom from Religious Persecution Act of 1997, H.R. 2431, 105th Cong. (1997).
6
According to USCIRF, “no administration since [IRFA’s] enactment has named an adviser
focusing only on international religious freedom; instead, all have assigned the issue to an
NSC director as part of a broader human rights and multilateral affairs portfolio.” U.S.
COMM. ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANN. REP. 11 (2017).
7
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, §102, 112 Stat. 2787,
2793 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6412).
8
Id.
9
Id. at 2794.
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point is critical inasmuch as it signaled Congress’ intention to measure violations
of freedom of religion and belief not based on the yardstick of U.S. law, but
rather as articulated under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).10
Where this reporting reveals a foreign government has engaged in or
tolerated violations of religious freedom, IRFA requires that the president take
action.11 Title IV of IRFA provides the president with a variety of measures
intended to “respond to the nature and severity of the violations of religious
freedom”12 at issue, with an eye towards securing the “cessation of such violations.”13 In the case of governments identified as violating religious freedom,
the statute provides the president with access to 15 specific actions, ranging
from “soft” actions, such as “private demarche” and “the delay or cancellation
of working, official, or state visits,” to more pointed steps including prohibiting
U.S. procurement from and loans to the targeted government.14 As an alternative to these specific actions, IRFA grants the president the open-ended ability
to take commensurate action or to “negotiate and enter into a binding agreement” with the government responsible for violations of religious freedom.15
Where the president concludes that a government’s action escalates
into engaging in or tolerating “particularly severe violations of religious
freedom”, IRFA requires that the country at issue be designated as a “country
of particular concern” (CPC) for religious freedom.16 This designation takes
10

Id. at §2(a)(5), 2788 (codified at 22 U.S.C. 6401). Violations under IRFA include “arbitrary
prohibitions on, restrictions of, or punishment for” peaceful religious assembly; expressions of
religious belief; changing one’s religious beliefs; possession and distribution of religious
literature; raising children according to the religious practices of one’s choosing; or “detention,
interrogation, imposition of an onerous financial penalty, forced labor, forced mass resettlement,
imprisonment, forced religious conversion, beating, torture, mutilation, rape, enslavement,
murder, and execution” committed on the basis of an individual’s religion or belief. Id. at §3(13),
2791 (codified at 22 U.S.C. 6401).
11
In 1999, President Clinton delegated this responsibility to the Secretary of State. See
Delegation of Responsibilities Under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 64
Fed. Reg. 47345 (Aug. 17, 1999).
12
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, § 401, 112 Stat. 2787,
2801 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6441).
13
Id. at 2801–2802.
14
Id. at § 405, 2806–07 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6445).
15
Id. at 2807.
16
Under the statute, “particular severe violations” means:
“[S]ystematic, ongoing, egregious violations of religious freedom,
including violations such as—
(A) torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;
(B) prolonged detention without charges;
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IRFA’s “soft” responses off the table. Instead, it commits the president to more
forceful action, ranging from the withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of
United States development assistance and security assistance to prohibiting
U.S. procurement from and loans to the targeted government.17 In these
“particularly severe” cases, the president may still opt for commensurate action
or a binding agreement with the violating government.18 At the same time,
IRFA also provides the president with the ability to waive any action on
designated CPCs where such a waiver would further the purposes of IRFA or
be in “the important national interest of the United States.”19
As illustrated in the table below, action taken in accordance with IRFA
has resulted in the president either authorizing sanctions on certain CPCs or
issuing multi-year waivers intended to further the purposes of IRFA or U.S.
national interest. In imposing sanctions on designated CPCs, however, the
president has virtually never opted to authorize new, IRFA-based sanctions. In
2005, the State Department denied export of defense articles and services
covered under the Arms Export Control Act to Eritrea. According to USCIRF,
“This was the first, and so far only, unique presidential action under (IRFA) in
response to a CPC designation.”20 Instead, past practice typically has resulted
in ordering preexisting sanctions already in place against a country (for reasons
unrelated to CPC designation under IRFA) to be “double hatted”, and therefore
also to reflect the penalty required under IRFA.
The table below also confirms that only 14 countries of the nearly 200
reviewed annually by the OIRF have ever been designated as CPCs. Additionally, the identity of these CPCs has remained relatively static over IRFA’s
lifetime, with most of them now chronic fixtures on the annually revised CPC
list. Of the current ten CPC-designated countries, Burma, China, Iran and
Sudan can all be traced back to the original list issued in 1999. Another four
countries—Eritrea, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Uzbekistan—were added
early in the last decade. Only two countries—Tajikistan and Turkmenistan—
recently joined the CPC list in 2014 and 2016 respectively.
(C) causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction or clandestine
rdetention of those persons; or
(D) other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of persons.”
Id. at 2791 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6402).
17
International Religious Freedom Act § 405, 112 Stat. at 2807 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6445).
18
Id.
19
Id. at 2808 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6445).
20
U.S. COMM. ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANN. REP. 47 (2010).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3314204

Vol. 4:2]

Wolf Act Amendments to the U.S. International Religious Freedom Act

157

Beyond the ten current CPC designations, only four additional
countries—Iraq under Saddam Hussain, Afghanistan under the Taliban, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia) under Slobodan Milošević, and
Vietnam—have made formal, if short-lived, appearances on the list. The
State Department removed the first three designations following military
interventions and ensuing regime changes. In the case of Vietnam, after a
short two-year stint on the CPC list, the U.S. Department of State heralded
improvements derived from a secretly-negotiated binding agreement with the
Vietnamese government as a sufficient basis for delisting that country.21 The
State Department has not added a new country to the CPC list since 2016.
In contrast with State Department practice, the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom’s (USCIRF) CPC recommendations divulge
a far wider variation in the number and identity of states persistently violating
religious freedom. For example, USCIRF’s most recent annual report
endorsed the State Department’s ten CPCs and called for six additional states
to be added to the list: Central African Republic, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia,
Syria, and Vietnam.22 Further to this, the Commission has introduced and
maintains its own “Tier 2” listing of countries. According to USCIRF, Tier 2
countries do not rise to the CPC level, but nevertheless have governments
identified as engaging in or tolerating serious violations “characterized by
at least one of the elements of the ‘systematic, ongoing, and egregious’ CPC
standard.”23 In 2018, the Commission included 12 countries within this
Tier 2 designation.24
From USCIRF’s perspective, “Over time, the disparities between
USCIRF’s CPC recommendations and the State Department’s CPC
designations have grown, with USCIRF consistently recommending more
countries than the secretary designates.”25 However, IRFA does not make
21

According to USCIRF, “Vietnam is unique in that it is the only [country] removed from the
CPC list due to diplomatic activity.” U.S. COMM. ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM IN VIETNAM: ASSESSING THE COUNTRY OF PARTICULAR CONCERN DESIGNATION 10
YEARS AFTER ITS REMOVAL, 1 (2017) [hereinafter U.S. COMM. ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM,
10 YEARS AFTER]. Moreover, Vietnam is also the only “known use of a binding agreement
pursuant to a CPC designation under IRFA.” Id. at 3. See also Press Release, U.S. Comm. On
Int’l Religious Freedom, Vietnam: USCIRF calls on the State Department to make “secret” May
5 agreement with Vietnam public (Jun. 22, 2005), https://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/press-re
leases/vietnam-uscirf-calls-the-state-department-make-secret-may-5-agreement [https://perma.c
c/5GU8-3TGU].
22
U.S. COMM. ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANN. REP. 3 (2018).
23
Id.
24
Id. (“Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan,
Laos, Malaysia, and Turkey.”).
25
U.S. COMM. ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 10 YEARS AFTER supra note 21 at 2.
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USCIRF’s views binding upon the president. Rather, the statute requires only
that the president “take into account any findings or recommendations by the
Commission” in making CPC designations.26
Table: CPC Designations and Sanctions Action, By Country 1999-201727
[Countries designated by shading are under CPC sanction waivers]

Country
Burma

Years
Sanction Action
Designated
1999Existing ongoing [arms embargo] restrictpresent
ions in 22 CFR 126.128

China

1999present

Existing ongoing restriction on exports to
China of crime control and detection instruments and equipment, under the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act of 1990 and
1991 (Pub. L. 101-246)

Eritrea

2004present

Ongoing [arms embargo] restrictions in 22
CFR 126.29

Iran30

1999present

Existing ongoing travel restrictions in
section 221(c) of the Iran Threat Reduction
and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA)
for individuals identified under section

26

International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, § 402, 112 Stat. 2787,
2802 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6442).
27
For sanctions reporting, see Secretary of State’s Determination Under the International
Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 83 Fed. Reg. 1451, 1452 (Jan. 11, 2018); 81 Fed. Reg. 87997,
87997 (Dec. 6, 2016); 81 Fed. Reg. 23344, 23345 (Apr. 20, 2016); 79 Fed. Reg. 57171, 57172
(Sep. 24, 2014); 77 Fed. Reg. 20687, 20688 (Apr. 5, 2012); 74 Fed. Reg. 21843 (May 11, 2009).
28
“In 2005 the Secretary continued the designation of a sanction, consisting of a prohibition on
exports or other transfers of defense articles and defense services pursuant to the Arms Export
Control Act . . .” 2006 Executive Summary: International Religious Freedom Report 2006, U.S.
DEPT. OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2006/71284.htm [https://perma.cc/RC7A82SP] (last visited Nov. 20, 2018).
29
The imposition of sanctions against Eritrea “was the first, and . . . only, unique presidential
action under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) in response to a CPC
designation.” U.S. COMM. ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANN. REP. 47 (2010).
30
“The United States has no diplomatic relations with [Iran] and thus cannot raise directly the
restrictions the Government places on religious freedom and other abuses that it commits against
adherents of minority religions.” 2005 Executive Summary: International Religious Freedom
Report 2005, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2005/51386.htm [https://
perma.cc/3SEJ-SWAV] (last visited Nov. 20, 2018).
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Years
Sanction Action
Designated
221(a)(1)(C) of the TRA in connection with
the commission of serious human rights
abuses.31

Democratic
People’s
Republic of
Korea32

2003present

Existing ongoing restrictions pursuant to
sections 402 and 409 of the Trade Act of
1974 (the Jackson-Vanik Amendment)

Saudi Arabia

2004present

Waiver as required in the “important national interest of the United States”33

31

The existing sanctions invoked to double-hat Iran’s CPC status have varied over time. For
example, in lieu of new IRFA-based sanctions against Iran, in 2012 the State Department
applied “the existing ongoing restrictions on certain imports from and exports to Iran, in
accordance with section 103(b) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-195).” Secretary of State’s Determination Under the
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 77 Fed. Reg. 20687–20688 (Apr. 5, 2012).
And in 2009: “For Iran, the existing ongoing restrictions on United States security assistance
in accordance with section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act . . . .” Secretary of State's
Determination Under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 74 Fed. Reg. 21843
(May. 11, 2009).
32
“The U.S. government does not have diplomatic relations with the country. The United
States cosponsored resolutions at the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council
condemning the government’s systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations.”
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK) 2017 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 1 (2017).
33
The State Department has used this language since 2014. Secretary of State’s
Determination Under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 79 Fed. Reg. 57171,
57172 (Sept. 24, 2014). The basis for the waiver has fluctuated over time. Until 2012, the
Secretary invoked a “waiver ‘to further the purposes of the act.’” Secretary of State’s
Determination Under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 77 Fed. Reg. 20687–
20688 (Apr. 5, 2012). In 2008, the State Department reported “because of new policies
confirmed by the Saudi Arabian Government, the Secretary renewed a waiver of sanctions
‘to further the purposes of the Act.’” Executive Summary: International Religious Freedom
Report 2008, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2008/108351.htm
[https://perma.cc/VP6A-QQ6X] (last visited Nov. 20, 2018). Similarly, in 2006, the State
Department “identif[ied] and confirm[ed] a number of key policies that the [Saudi]
[g]overnment is pursuing and will continue to pursue for the purposes of promoting greater
freedom for religious practice and increased tolerance for religious groups . . . .” In view of
these developments, the Secretary issued a waiver of sanctions “to further the purposes of
the Act.” U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, SAUDI ARABIA: INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
REPORT 2006 15 (2006).
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Years
Sanction Action
Designated
1999Restriction in the annual Department of
present
State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act on making
certain appropriated funds available for
assistance to the Government of Sudan,
currently set forth in section 7042(j) of the
Department of State, Foreign Operations,
and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
2015 (Div. K, Pub. L. 114-113), and any
provision of law that is the same or
substantially the same as this provision.34

Tajikistan

2016present

Waiver as required in the “important
national interest of the United States”

Turkmenistan

2014present

Waiver as required in the “important
national interest of the United States”

Uzbekistan

2006present

Waiver as required in the “important
national interest of the United States”35

Vietnam

2004200636

On May 5, 2005, the United States and
Vietnam concluded an agreement that
addresses a number of important religious
freedom concerns. Under the agreement,

34

Sanctions double-hatted for Sudan’s CPC designation have varied slightly over time. See,
e.g., Secretary of State’s Determination Under the International Religious Freedom Act of
1998, 81 Fed. Reg. 23344–23345 (Apr. 20, 2016); Secretary of State’s Determination Under
the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 77 Fed. Reg. 20687–20688 (Apr. 5, 2012).
In 2009, the State Department’s double-hatted CPC sanction used “the voice and vote of the
United States to oppose any loan or other use of the funds of international financial institutions
to or for Sudan, consistent with section 1621 of the International Financial Institutions Act.”
Secretary of State’s Determination Under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 74
Fed. Reg. 21843 (May. 11, 2009).
35
Previously, the State Department invoked its waiver to “further the purposes of the Act.”
77 Fed. Reg. 20687–20688 (Apr. 5, 2012). See also Executive Summary, International
Religious Freedom Report 2009, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/20
09/127215.htm [https://perma.cc/LWE2-LKY4].
36
In November 2006, the State Department formally removed Vietnam’s CPC designation.
“[O]n December 29, 2006, the United States granted Vietnam Permanent Normal Trade
Relations (PNTR) status, paving the way for Vietnam to join the WTO on January 11, 2007.”
U.S. COMM. ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 10 YEARS AFTER supra note 21 at 4.
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Iraq38
Afghanistan/
Taliban
Regime
Serbia/
Milosevic
Regime
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Years
Sanction Action
Designated
Vietnam made a number of commitments
including: “to fully implement the new laws
on religious activities and to render previous
contradictory regulations obsolete, to instruct
local authorities to adhere strictly and completely to the new legislation and ensure their
compliance.” This binding agreement enabled
Vietnam to avoid “sanctions or another ‘commensurate action’ associated with CPC designations under IRFA.”37
1999-2004 CPC status removed in June 2004.39
1999-2003 Identified “as a matter of policy . . . as a ‘particularly severe violator’ of religious freedom,
though it cannot be designated as a ‘country of
particular concern’ because it is not a government recognized by the United States.”40
1999-2001 Designated Serbia under the Milosevic
regime as a ‘country of particular concern.’ 41

37

Id. at 2–3. From USCIRF’s perspective, “Vietnam’s brief placement on the CPC list demonstrated that the pairing of the CPC designation with the binding agreement worked to foster highlevel cooperation between the United States and Vietnam, even if not to solidify lasting religious
freedom improvements.” Id. at 5.
38
“Prior to the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, the United States had no diplomatic relations
with Iraq and thus was unable to raise directly with the Government the problems of severe
restrictions on religious freedom and other human rights abuses. However, the U.S. Government
made its position clear in public statements and in diplomatic contacts with other states.” Iraq:
International Religious Freedom Report 2003, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/
rls/irf/2003/24452.htm [https://perma.cc/3MRS-WJWY] (last visited Jan. 7, 2019).
39
The 2004 IRF Report contained no Iraq chapter due to the U.S. occupation of that country.
According to the State Department, “we do not report on our own governance but welcome the
scrutiny of other responsible reporters. The reporting period end[ed] on June 30, which roughly
coincide[d] with the date of the transfer of power from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the
Iraqi Interim Government. In June, the Secretary acted to remove Iraq’s designation as a ‘Country
of Particular Concern’ for its severe violations of religious freedom under the regime of Saddam
Hussein. Executive Summary: International Religious Freedom Report 2004, U.S. DEPT. OF
STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2004/35335.htm [https://perma.cc/N6DS-XNDH] (last
visited Nov. 20, 2018).
40
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ANN. REP. ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 2001 xxix (2001).
41
“This designation was lifted in January 2001 after Vojislav Kostunica was elected president.”
Id. at xxxiii.
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Beyond USCIRF’s critique that CPC designations have been too few
and too static, IRFA more generally has been subject to criticism from a
variety of sources and from the moment of its conception.42 As Rep. Chris
Smith has described it: “frankly [IRFA] was a very tough sell. There were
people in the administration and Congress who opposed it. But there was a
broad coalition that came together to support the bill, bipartisan, ecumenical
and inclusive of foreign policy experts that made the difference.”43
Affirming this residual opposition, President Bill Clinton attached a
lengthy statement to his signature of the IRFA bill. Clinton expressed concern
that the imposition of economic penalties against states violating religious
freedom “could result in even greater pressures—and possibly reprisals—
against minority religious communities that the bill is intended to help.”44 He
also stressed that such measures would only be applicable in extreme situations
where CPC status is triggered, and even then, the president preserved the ability
to waive such action where it “would further the purpose of the Act, or if
required by important national interests.”45 More critically, Clinton regretted
those provisions that in his view “lack[ed] this flexibility and infringe on the
authority vested by the Constitution solely with the President.”46 As an
example, Clinton rejected Congress’ attempt to “direct . . . the president to
undertake negotiations with foreign governments for specified foreign policy
purposes” or to brief Congress “concerning these negotiations” as impeding
the president’s “constitutional responsibilities to conduct foreign affairs.”47
A consultation held soon after IRFA’s passage that brought government
officials, human rights professionals, representatives of religious organizations,
scholars, and others together is telling of the statute’s touchy origins and
uncertain future. The editors of this meeting’s proceedings described IRFA’s
congressional authors as proud of “crafting a piece of legislation that balanced
42

For insight into the administration’s criticisms of an early iteration of IRFA, see The
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998: Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
105th Cong. (1998) (statement of John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy,
Human Rights and Labor) (listing five main concerns, including IRFA’s creation of new
institutions and the requirement that the president impose executive actions or economic sanctions
against violators).
43
Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2015; and Calling for the Release of
Ukrainian Fighter Pilot Nadiya Savechenko: Markup Before the H. Subcomm. on Africa, Global
Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs 114th Cong. 50 (2015).
44
William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998,
AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Oct. 27, 1998), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=55155.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
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the bully pulpit of moral exhortation with the exigencies of conducting foreign
policy in a complicated world.” Conversely, academic critics “took aim at the
very idea of singling out religion for protection”, while human rights activists
“worried about the effect of the new U.S. initiative on multilateral approaches to
human rights around the world.” Though described as a “debate among
friends,”48 over the course of the two-day conference “the veneer of politeness .
. . rubbed away and . . . the participants were mixing it up with considerable
vehemence.”49
As one manifestation of this academic critique, Johan D. van der Vyver
blasted IRFA for exemplifying the United States’ “sense of self-righteousness,” by presuming to judge other states “while refusing to submit itself to the
dictates of international law.”50 Van der Vyver also questioned the flexibility
IRFA provided the president for waiving action against designated CPCs on
the basis of national interest: “The flexibility component . . . is also highly
questionable from the perspective of the basic principles of justice in politics
and in jurisprudence…Jurisprudentially, religious persecution ought not to
escape punitive action…at the pleasure of the agency of enforcement.”51
In a similar vein, Peter Danchin criticized IRFA’s creation of an
“irrational hierarchy of human rights in U.S. foreign policy that makes the
act vulnerable to politicization and abuse of the human rights agenda.”52
Danchin further claimed IRFA “demonstrate[d] a failure of international
participation and cooperation”53 and “indirectly perpetuate[d] a strand of
thinking in U.S. foreign policy that views the international order as being
divided into two camps—liberal and illiberal.”54
48

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE, TRINITY COLLEGE; RELIGIOUS
PERSECUTION AS A U.S. POLICY ISSUE: PROCEEDINGS OF A CONSULTATION HELD AT TRINITY
COLLEGE 3 (Rosalind I. J. Hackett, et al., eds., 2000).
49
Id.
50
Johan D. van der Vyver, American Exceptionalism: Human Rights, International Criminal
Justice, and National Self-Righteousness, 50 EMORY L. J. 775, 827 (2001). Van der Vyer
questioned IRFA’s constitutionality as “entangling” the federal government in religion and
presuming to apply a suspect “religious test” for appointments to USCIRF. Id. at 828.
51
Id. at 829. Van der Vyver concedes that IRFA “serves at least one useful purpose: the
accumulation and publication of factual data on the state of religious freedom in different
countries of the world.” Id. at 828.
52
Peter G. Danchin, U.S. Unilateralism and the International Protection of Religious
Freedom: The Multilateral Alternative, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 33, 41 (2002).
53
Id. at 41.
54
Id. at 42. Danchin’s proposed solution for remedying violations of freedom of religion or
belief is premised on a “transnational legal process whereby internal and external actors are
engaged in a process of repeated interaction in such a way that the relevant norms eventually
become internalized in the constitutional, legal, and political systems of all states.” Id. at 135.
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Writing during the same period, other observers attempted to address
and rebut these and similar critiques. For example, Jeremy Gunn, who held
early positions at USCIRF and the State Department’s Office of International
Religious Freedom, rejected the assertion that IRFA reflected only the
“political interests of the Christian Right.”55 Rather, he found “no obvious
effort by the United States to favor Christians nor to seek remedies for
Christian groups at the expense of other faiths.”56 Reinforcing this
perspective, Allen D. Hertzke observed that the campaign for IRFA’s passage
brought together “a wide coalition of unlikely allies” moving beyond
evangelical groups exclusively to include “Jewish organizations, the
Episcopal Church, the Catholic Conference [of Bishops], Tibetan Buddhists,
and Iranian Bahá’ís among many others.”57 Further, because IRFA’s
yardstick for measuring religious freedom was grounded in international
norms, Hertzke argued U.S. officials could “legitimately…claim that they are
not attempting to impose ‘our values’ on the rest of the world. Rather, in
implementing IRFA the United States is merely calling upon other nations to
live up to covenants they have approved.”58
Addressing the complaint that IRFA established an improper
“hierarchy of human rights. . . [with] religion freedom at its zenith,”59 Gunn
countered that the legislation did not prioritize freedom of religion, but
instead functioned to highlight “an important, vulnerable, and heretofore
neglected right.”60 In direct response to Danchin’s claim that IRFA embodied
U.S. unilateralism, Gunn was even blunter:
[O]ne suspects that if the United States were not the target,
Danchin and the globalists would not be so critical of unilateral
action… . No country, and certainly not the United States,
should be exempted from criticism. But Danchin’s article
55

T. Jeremy Gunn, A Preliminary Response to Criticisms of the International Religious
Freedom Act of 1998, 2000 B. Y. U. L. REV. 841, 851 (2000).
56
Id. at 855.
57
Allen D. Hertzke, International Religious Freedom Policy: Taking Stock, 2 FAITH & INT’L
AFF. 17, 19 (2008).
58
Id. at 18.
59
Gunn, supra note 55, at 856. While conceding that IRFA will face an uphill struggle if it
is perceived as “promoting a peculiarly American notion of religious freedom,” Gunn
concluded “IRFA’s critics . . . frequently caricature the law and the efforts of the United
States by loosely employing clichés such as ‘Lone Ranger,’ ‘imperialism,’ and ‘marketoriented religion.’ Such rhetorical criticisms are made without fully understanding how
American diplomats actually engage other governments in discussions regarding
discrimination on the basis of religion.” Id. at 865.
60
Id. at 857.
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exemplifies a real problem that sometimes occurs in the human
rights community: subjecting the United States to an
exceptional form of criticism that can often lead to exaggerated
and distorted analysis.61
Despite the effort of Gunn and others, many of the same criticisms
and misconceptions surrounding IRFA persisted or evolved over time.62 For
example, writing in 2005, Eugenia Relano Pastor concluded that “While
IRFA sets out to protect international religious freedom, its enforcement is
undermined by the United States’ other foreign policy interests, such as the
war on terrorism, and a decidedly unilateral approach to the achievement of
religious liberty around the globe.”63 José Casanova similarly reiterated that
IRFA is perceived as being “culturally insensitive or imperialistic”64 and that
“the United States doesn’t have a very good record in recognizing the
applicability of international law to itself.”65
This debate persisted well into IRFA’s second decade, with policymakers, academics and activists alike continuing to take sides over the merits of
U.S. reporting and policing of religious freedom conditions abroad.66 For
example, at a Pew Research Center forum held to commemorate ten years since
IRFA’s passage, John Shattuck, the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor under President Clinton, observed that four key
misconceptions continued to hamper IRFA’s effectives: first, the “legislation
61

T. Jeremy Gunn, American Exceptionalism and Globalist Double Standards: A More
Balanced Alternative, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 137, 151–52 (2002).
62
Eugenia Relano Pastor, The Flawed Implementation of the International Religious
Freedom Act of 1998: A European Perspective, 2005 B.Y. U. L. REV. 711, 739 (2005). Pastor
takes issue with some of Gunn’s rebuttals, and argues, among other things that “it is difficult,
if not impossible, for IRFA not to be influenced by the American historical experience
regarding freedom of religion ideas” and that actual enforcement of IRFA “inevitably yields
to the United States’ other foreign and domestic interests.” Id. at 739, 743.
63
Id. at 712. Observing that every CPC except for Burma successfully escaped new sanctions
under IRFA, Pastor concludes that “actions taken under IRFA have been very limited, if
existent at all.” Id at 742. This corresponds with the evidence presented in the table above.
64
José Casanova, Balancing Religious Freedom and Cultural Preservation, 2 FAITH & INT’L
AFFAIRS 13, 14 (2008).
65
Id at 15.
66
For example, an entire volume of THE REVIEW OF FAITH & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS is
dedicated to contemplating IRFA at its ten-year anniversary. REV. FAITH & INT’L AFF.
(2008). Another recent critical take on IRFA presented by Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, argues
the statute represents “the latest installment in a history of U.S. attempts to promote
American strategic interests through social and religious engineering projects abroad.”
Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Religious Freedom, American-Style, in RELIGIOUS RIGHTS 106
(Lorenzo Zucca ed., 2015).
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predominantly represents the interests of missionary religions, interested in
proselytizing and changing people’s religious views in other countries”; second,
“the U.S. cares more about religious freedom as we define it than about other
international human rights”; third, it “is based on a punitive model, in which
mandatory sanctions are imposed”; and fourth, that it exemplifies U.S.
unilateralism.67 Though Shattuck attempted to rebut these misconceptions, he
also acknowledged that IRFA’s effectiveness continued to be undermined by the
inability to move beyond “naming and shaming” to the “much larger effort to
connect religious freedom with the mainstream of our foreign policy.”68 More
practically, a 2013 report prepared for Congress by the Government
Accountability Office concluded that while the State Department and USCIRF
were implementing their responsibilities under IRFA, “they have not defined
how they should interact, which has at times created tensions with foreigngovernment officials.”69
Other observers build on the concern that IRFA has not been
implemented effectively. For example, Thomas Farr, Former Director of the
Department of State’s Office of International Religious Freedom, observed
that Democratic and Republican administrations as well as the State
Department have failed to make promotion of religious liberty a central
element of U.S. foreign policy. Instead, these actors have opted to relegate
IRFA to nothing more “than a narrow humanitarian measure unrelated to
broader U.S. interests.”70 To remedy this, Farr has argued a major change in
approach is necessary: “U.S. diplomacy should move resolutely to make the
defense and expansion of religious freedom a core component of U.S. foreign
policy. Doing so would give the United States a powerful new tool for
advancing ordered liberty and for undermining religion-based extremism at
a time when other strategies have proved inadequate.”71
Farr’s emphasis relies on policymakers reorienting IRFA’s priority
away from opposing religious persecution and freeing religious prisoners in
favor of a more “sustained discourse” that instead emphasizes the promotion
67

John Shattuck, CEO, John F. Kennedy Library Foundation, Remarks at the Panel on
International Religious Freedom: Religion and International Diplomacy (May 8, 2007)
(transcript available at http://www.pewforum.org/2007/05/08/international-religious-freedomreligion-and-international-diplomacy [https://perma.cc/AML8-THP5]).
68
Id.
69
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-196, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
ACT: STATE DEPARTMENT AND COMMISSION ARE IMPLEMENTING RESPONSIBILITIES BUT
NEED TO IMPROVE INTERACTION 28 (2013).
70
Thomas Farr, Diplomacy in an Age of Faith: Religious Freedom and National Security,
87 FOREIGN AFF. 110, 111 (2008).
71
Id.
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of “political order centered on religious liberty.” In contrast, Hertzke has
concluded that the “transformational change” necessary to cement IRFA’s
success must come from a “renewed commitment among religious communities to extend the freedom they enjoy in the United States to others around
the globe.” As evidence of the absence of this commitment, Hertzke
commented in 2008: “It is telling that, in contrast to trafficking legislation
pressed by the same faith-based movement, IRFA has not subsequently been
amended… efforts to strengthen the law seem warranted.”72
II. THE EFFORT TO AMEND IRFA, 2015-2016: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
ON THE ROAD TO PUBLIC LAW 114-281
While IRFA did undergo several small changes since its passage in
1998,73 Hertze’s observation concerning the absence of a concerted effort to
strengthen the law continued to hold true, at least until 2016.74 The amendments authorized by President Obama at the end of that year represent the
most significant overhaul of IRFA since its inception. Congress intended
these amendments to “improve the ability of the United States to advance
religious freedom globally.”75 However, the underpinning legislative history
reveals ongoing disagreements over the extent to which religious freedom
should inform U.S. foreign policy. Further, this legislative history also brings
into question the extent to which the United States government is prepared to
commit resources to its continued policing and betterment.
This section traces the Wolf Act’s legislative history to uncover the
compromises and changes demanded before Congress moved to approve
amendments to IRFA. Using the original House bill submitted in early 2015 as
72

Hertzke, supra note 57, at 22. Among other things, Hertzke suggests “a religious freedom
specialist be appointed to the National Security Council”; elevating the IRF office within the
State Department; requiring “[b]roader religious training for diplomatic personnel”; and
prohibiting the president from “double hatting” sanctions “to provide more teeth and
bargaining leverage.” Id. at 22–23.
73
Until 2016, IRFA-related amendments typically tweaked statutory language or addressed
reauthorization and reform of USCIRF. For example, see An Act to amend the International
Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 113-154, 128 Stat. 1827 (2014) (codified at 22
U.S.C. § 6401), and United States Commission on International Religious Freedom Reform
and Reauthorization Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-75, 125 Stat. 1272 (2011) (codified at 22
U.S.C. § 6401).
74
In 2011, Frank Wolf, author of the original 1998 IRFA statute, introduced the International
Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 2011. International Religious Freedom Act
Amendments of 2011, H.R. 1846, 112th Cong. (2011). This bill included several of the
amendments contained in the 2015 Wolf Act; however, it never came to a vote in Congress.
75
Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 114-281, 130 Stat. 1426
(2016) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6401).
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a departure point, the ensuing history demonstrates that numerous provisions
intended to boost IRFA’s effectiveness were either diluted or altogether
removed. In many cases, these changes meant abandoning sought after
improvements or leaving in their place vague and open-ended provisions
unlikely to achieve intended results.
A. Wolf Act as Originally Introduced – February 2015
Representative Chris Smith (R-NJ) introduced major amendments to
IRFA in February 2015. According to Smith, the impetus for House Resolution
1150, the “Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2015,”
stemmed from recognition that IRFA needed “to be updated to match the new
challenges of the 21st century…by upgrading the tools, training and resources
used by the administration to advance this fundamental human right.” In Smith’s
view, adopting H.R. 1150’s proposed amendments would “better address a
growing religious persecution globally and help the administration and State
Department to better respond to violent extremism globally as well.”76
Religious freedom advocates and human rights organizations
generally supported the effort to revise IRFA. For example, the United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) considered H.R. 1150 “an
important first step in improving the [United States’] ability . . . to advance
religious freedom globally. It would signify the determination of the United
States to promote and protect this most fundamental of human rights.”77
Similarly, the International Religious Freedom Roundtable, an umbrella
group of over 30 “organizations and individuals who are scholars, religious
leaders, human rights advocates and practitioners” called attention to the
“deepening crisis” surrounding international religious freedom.78 This group
reasoned the amendments reflected in H.R. 1150 would “send a clear and
urgent message regarding the inherent dignity of every human being, as well
as our common global security in the fight against persecution and religious
extremism, and terrorism.”79
76

Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2015; and Calling for the Release
of Ukrainian Fighter Pilot Nadiya Savechenko, supra note 43 at 50–51 (statement of Rep.
Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Afr., Global Health, Global Human
Rights, and Int’l Orgs).
77
H.R. Doc. No. 114-62, at 58 (2015) (providing a letter from the U.S. Conference of
Catholic Bishops in support of H.R. 1150).
78
Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2015; and Calling for the Release
of Ukrainian Fighter Pilot Nadiya Savechenko, supra note 43 at 50–51.
79
Id. at 59 (providing a letter from the International Religious Freedom Roundtable in
support of H.R. 1150).
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During the bill’s original markup before the House Subcommittee on
Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations,
Rep. Smith highlighted several specific changes his amendments to IRFA
sought to achieve, including:
•
•
•

•
•

Better training to “equip diplomats to counter terrorism,
address anti-Semitism . . . end religious persecution and mitigate sectarian conflict”;
Enhancing the position of the Ambassador-at-Large for
International Religious Freedom, by requiring direct reporting to the Secretary of State;
Creating “a new special watch list” that would introduce a
tier system for reporting on violations of freedom of religion
or belief, for the purpose of putting “on notice those countries
that should be or are close to being a CPC”;80
A reauthorization of USCIRF until 2021;81 and
Enabling the president to designate non-state actors . . .
“as severe violators of international religious freedom.”82

Several of these changes augured a dramatic expansion of IRFA. To
justify them, Smith’s draft offered new legislative findings to supplement
those already underpinning IRFA. Among other things, these findings noted
“growing evidence that demonstrates a connection between the absence of
religious freedom and increased levels of…religiously motivated conflict,
violent extremism, and terrorism, including the kind of terrorism that has
reached the United States.” Further, H.R. 1150 asserted it was “increasingly
clear that understanding religion and the political and security implications
of religious motivation and conviction is critical to the success of United
States diplomacy and foreign policy initiatives.”83
On diplomatic training, IRFA originally required the Secretary of State
to “establish as part of the standard training” for foreign service officers (FSOs)
“instruction in the field of internationally recognized human rights.”84 The
80

Id.
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom Reauthorization Act of 2015,
Pub. L. No. 114-71, § 3, 129 Stat. 563 (2015) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6401, 6342) reauthorized
USCIRF through fiscal year 2019.
82
Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2015; and Calling for the Release
of Ukrainian Fighter Pilot Nadiya Savechenko, supra note 43 at 51.
83
Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015).
84
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, § 708, 112 Stat. 2787,
2795 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 4028).
81
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statute directed that training include “instruction on international documents
and United States policy in human rights” and “instruction on the internationally
recognized right to freedom of religion, the nature, activities, and beliefs of
different religions, and the various aspects and manifestations of violations of
religious freedom.”85 However, IRFA only designated as mandatory the former,
and then, only for those FSO members “having reporting responsibilities
relating to human rights and for chiefs of mission.”86
In practice, the extent and effectiveness of the training that emerged
from the State Department testified to an ambivalent implementation which
likely fell short of meaningfully connecting religious freedom to mainstream
U.S. foreign policy. According to Thomas Farr, the results were disappointing:
“For the past 12 years training has been ad hoc, inconsistent and ineffective.”87
A Congressionally-mandated GAO report from 2013 confirmed that the State
Department had “taken steps to implement” its obligation to integrate religious
freedom into its FSO training. However, its assessment betrayed an apathetic
and perfunctory approach. According to the GAO’s findings, since IRFA’s
passage, the Foreign Service Institute managed only to add “religious freedom
to . . . a 90-minute session covering human rights” that is mandatory for
political and economic officers and to require new FSOs to attend a mandatory
1-hour orientation session “on human rights that includes information about
international religious freedom.” In addition, State required “chiefs of mission
to take a 2-week ambassadorial seminar, which includes a 45-minute session
on global issues, including human rights.” Lastly, beginning in 2011 State
began piloting an optional three-day “religious freedom–specific course titled
‘Religion and Foreign Policy’.” This voluntary course was subsequently
expanded to four days but had been offered only three times over a period of
two years.88 Aside from its late introduction and non-mandatory nature, this
course also drew criticism for “not focus[ing] on U.S. international religious
freedom policy so much as [on] the idea of religious engagement.”89
85

Id.
Id.
87
Prioritizing International Religious Freedom in U.S. Foreign Policy: Hearing Before the
H. Subcomm. on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights of the H. Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 112th Cong. 42 (2011) (statement of Thomas Farr, Director, Religious Freedom
Project, Berkley Center For Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, Georgetown University).
88
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 69 at 18. Farr questioned the effectiveness
of this course due to its “occasional and voluntary” nature. Prioritizing International
Religious Freedom in U.S. Foreign Policy, supra note 87.
89
Prioritizing International Religious Freedom in U.S. Foreign Policy, supra note 87, at 43
(statement of Mr. Thomas Farr, Director, Religious Freedom Project, Berkley Center for
Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, Georgetown University).
86
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In response to this track record on training, the Wolf Act’s new
provision on mandatory training90 obligated the Secretary of State to carry
out an elaborate religious freedom curriculum covering:
. . . the scope and strategic value of international religious
freedom, how violations of international religious freedom
harm fundamental United States interests, how the
advancement of international religious freedom can advance
such interests, how United States international religious
freedom policy should be carried out in practice by United
States diplomats and other Foreign Service officers, and the
relevance and relationship of international religious freedom
to United States defense, diplomacy, development, and public
affairs efforts to combat violent extremism.91
The bill required this curriculum to be implemented within one year
of enactment of the law and also made training mandatory for “all Foreign
Service officers . . . including all entry level officers, all officers prior to
departure for posting outside the United States, and all outgoing deputy chiefs
of mission and ambassadors.”92 Further, it required such training “be shared
with the United States Armed Forces, intelligence community . . . and all
other Federal departments and agencies whose personnel serve as attachés,
advisors, or detailees in United States embassies globally.”93 The inclusion
of robust and mandatory training for all FSOs signaled a win for USCIRF and
others that had long advocated for such a measure.94 Its incorporation as a
90

This provision borrowed from and significantly expanded upon a previously abandoned
effort to amend the State Department’s religious freedom training. See International
Religious Freedom Acts Amendments of 2011, H.R. 1846, 112th Cong. § 103 (2011).
91
Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 103 (2015).
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Supporters in Congress had attempted to pass similar amendments to the State Department’s
religious freedom training previously. See International Religious Freedom Act Amendments
of 2011, H.R. 1856, 112th Cong. §103 (2011) (noting the required training for foreign service
officers.); see also Prioritizing International Religious Freedom in U.S. Foreign Policy, supra
note 87, at 33 (statement of Mr. Leonard Leo, USCIRF chairman) (noting “while there is some
training in religious freedom for Foreign Service officers there needs to be more, and it needs
to be part of the core curriculum.”); HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, HOW TO PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: BLUEPRINT FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION 12 (2012) (recommending,
among other things, “that religious freedom and religious literacy curricula be incorporated into
Foreign Service Institute (FSI) A100 courses, area-study courses, and mandatory training for
all ambassadors and deputy chiefs of mission.”).
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needed amendment to IRFA also reflected at least a partial remedy for the
impression religious freedom was languishing as a core component of U.S.
foreign policy.
To further support this training curriculum and create a more “sustained
discourse” on religious freedom as a key part of U.S. foreign policy, the
proposed legislation also included long-sought upgrades to the Ambassador at
Large for Religious Freedom (IRF) and the Office on International Religious
Freedom (OIRF). With respect to the Ambassador at Large, IRFA’s original
structure envisioned the IRF Ambassador to “be a principal adviser to the
President and the Secretary of State.”95 However, in practice, the State
Department relegated OIRF within the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor (DRL) (headed by an assistant secretary of state) and under the
oversight of the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human
Rights (J).96 This organizational structure had the effect of twice removing the
Ambassador at Large from access to the Secretary of State. Moreover, it stood
in contrast with other State Department Special Envoys and Special
Representatives—as well as similarly situated ambassadors at large—who
maintained a direct line of communication to or were housed within the Office
of the Secretary of State.97 In Thomas Farr’s view, this practice had deleterious
effects: “When senior meetings are held on U.S. policy in China or Saudi
Arabia—or even on engaging Islam—the IRF function is not considered
relevant. This may seem trivial to those outside the State Department. Inside,
it communicates a deadly message: IRF is not a mainstream foreign policy
issue and can safely be ignored.”98
The State Department’s track record of discounting the IRF ambassador did not go unnoticed by Congress. In 2011, Former Rep. Frank Wolf
lamented the fact that “[o]ver successive administrations this critical position
has not been treated with the seniority it deserves.”99 In response, he introduced
legislation intended to repair the stature of the IRF ambassador and office.
While this proposed legislative fix ultimately languished in committee, the
2015 Wolf Act as introduced revived the proposals and expanded upon
95

International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, §101, 112 Stat. 2787
(1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6401).
96
See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, ORGANIZATION CHART (2016), https://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/263637.pdf.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 40: THE
UNDER SECRETARIES OF STATE (2018) (detailing that the State Department’s DRL Bureau,
overseen by an assistant secretary, reports to the Under Secretary for Civilian Security,
Democracy, and Human Rights).
97
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, ORGANIZATION CHART supra note 96.
98
Farr, supra note 70, at 118.
99
157 CONG. REC. 854 (2011) (statement of Rep. Frank R. Wolf).
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them.100 Two foundational changes directed that the IRF office “shall be
located in the Office of the Secretary of State” and that the IRF Ambassador
“shall report directly to the Secretary of State.”101 These proposed amendments
would not only have the visual effect of aligning the IRF issue with other “at
large” diplomatic priorities, but would serve to erase the existing bureaucratic
distance between IRF and the Secretary of State.
To reinforce these structural changes, the bill also attached sweeping
new responsibilities to the IRF Ambassador’s mandate and sought to elevate
the influence of the office. Beyond generally advancing the right to freedom
of religion abroad and recommending appropriate responses, the Ambassador
would now strive more specifically to:
. . . integrate United States international religious freedom
policies and religious engagement strategies into democracy,
civil society, conflict prevention and mitigation, and
development efforts funded by the United States and into the
counterterrorism policies of Federal agencies, including the
Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security,
the Department of State, and the Department of the Treasury.102
Furthermore, the ambassador would be tasked with the new duty of
coordinating “religious freedom policies and religious engagement strategies
across all programs, projects, and activities of the United States.” This
responsibility envisioned the IRF Ambassador engaging in an open-ended
manner with “any appropriate programs, projects, and activities of the
Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department
of State, the Department of the Treasury, and the United States Agency for
International Development.”103
To reinforce the import attached to these new responsibilities, H.R.
1150 as introduced upgraded the IRF Ambassador’s standing from “a principle
advisor” to “the principle advisor” to the President and the Secretary of State
on matters affecting religious freedom abroad.104 Together with this, the draft
legislation also sought to strengthen OIRF. It specified that staffing would
consist of “individuals to fill at least 20 full-time equivalent staff positions, and
100

Compare International Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 2011, H.R. 1856, 112th
Cong. §101 and Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong.
§ 101 (2015).
101
H.R. 1856, §101.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
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other temporary staff positions as needed…including a senior advisor for the
Office.”105 Funding for the office would be secured at a level sufficient to
enable OIRF to conduct investigations “on conditions of religious freedom on
a worldwide basis, and for any necessary travel to carry out the provisions of
this Act.” Further, the Secretary of State would provide the IRF Ambassador
with “representation funds that are sufficient to carry out the duties
described…at least equal to the amount of representation funds provided to
other Ambassadors at Large in the Department of State.”106
Related to these changes intended to secure the integration of
international religious freedom matters within the decision-making echelons of
the federal government, H.R. 1150 also sought to install a new Special Adviser
for Global Religion Engagement and International Religious Freedom within
the National Security Council (NSC). As originally enacted, IRFA contained
only a “sense of Congress” provision suggesting the president appoint a Special
Adviser on International Religious Freedom to serve as a resource within the
NSC.107 Such “sense of” provisions “merely express the opinion of Congress
or the relevant chamber. They have no formal effect on public policy and have
no force of law.”108 That said, they may serve as incubators for potential shifts
in Congressional policy priorities or provide “an early signal that Congress will
alter statutory provisions” where its informally expressed will is insufficient to
effectively influence policy.109
Over IRFA’s lifetime, no president ever acted to follow through with
Congress’ recommendation to staff the NSC with an IRF advisor.110 Faced
with this inaction, H.R. 1150 moved to replace the “sense of Congress” provision with a requirement that the president appoint an NSC special advisor with
more senior status and a broader set of responsibilities. Rather than sit at a
director level, the new special advisor position would be “comparable to that
of a senior director.”111 Similarly, rather than be tasked with generally serving
105

Id.
Id.
107
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, § 301, 112 Stat. 2787
(1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6401).
108
CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-825, “SENSE OF” RESOLUTIONS
AND PROVISIONS 1 (2016).
109
Id. at 2.
110
Joseph K. Grieboski, It is Time to Prioritize Religious Freedom in U.S. Foreign Policy,
HUFF. POST (Jun. 8, 2011), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-k-grieboski/it-is-time-toprioritize-_b_872758.html [https://perma.cc/PK6X-AHGB].
111
Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2015: Markup Before the
Subcomm. on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations
of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 114th Cong. §301 (statement of Rep. Smith).
106
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as a resource for executive branch officials, making policy recommendations,
and serving as liaison with the IRF Ambassador and USCIRF, the new
provision defined responsibilities in concrete detail. For example, the new
special advisor would assist the IRF Ambassador “to coordinate international
religious freedom policies” and “develop policy recommendations and
strategies relevant to the programs, projects, [and] activities” across a variety
of Federal departments and agencies.112
The Wolf Act as introduced also directed the NSC to establish two
permanent interagency policy committees. The first, covering “International
Religious Freedom and Global Religion Engagement,” was to be chaired by
the IRF Ambassador and tasked with developing “a strategy globally to
advance international religious freedom.” The second, on “Religion, International Religious Freedom, and National Security,” was to be co-chaired by the
IRF Ambassador and Deputy National Security Advisor, and tasked with
identifying “potential national security risks related to the absence of religious
freedom globally.”113
These proposed permanent committees further evidenced the desire of
IRFA supporters to provide international religious freedom advocacy with a
greater voice within the executive branch and deepen the IRF Ambassador’s
role in the policy formulation process. They also signaled an effort to push past
IRFA’s original vision by creating not only a figurehead presence within the
NSC, but new institutionalized frameworks intended to position religion and
religious freedom as central considerations in policy analysis and policy
creation.114 As if to underscore the import of these proposed changes, the bill
required the President to promulgate regulations implementing the new
committees within 90 days. Related to this, the bill, through a nonbinding
“sense of Congress” provision, called on the president’s annual national
security strategy report to “promote international religious freedom as a foreign
policy and national security priority” and to serve as “a guide for the strategies
and activities of relevant Federal agencies” as well as inform quadrennial
reviews at the Department of Defense and Department of State.115
The 2015 amendments championed by Rep. Smith also sought to bring
greater nuance to IRFA’s CPC designation process. By introducing a formalized
112

Id.
H.R. 1150, §301.
114
See International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, § 101, 112 Stat.
2787 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6401) (noting Rep. Wolf’s 2011 effort at amending
IRFA did not put forward a similar provision for the creation of NSC committees
incorporating consideration of religion and religious freedom.)
115
Id. at § 703.
113
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“Special Watch List,”116 the president could for the first time single out a country
or class of countries violating religious freedom but falling short of the statutory
requirements necessary to trigger CPC status. In Rep. Smith’s view, this change
would enable IRFA to benefit from a system already in use by the State
Department as part of its mandated reporting on trafficking in persons. An
added tier or level of scrutiny to IRFA’s Manichean bad/other template could
serve to “put on notice those countries that should be or are close to being a CPC
. . . so that we can begin working diplomatically to prioritize those countries.”117
Notably, this new intermediate designation came with a significant
escalatory trigger. According to the terms of the proposed amendment, any
country appearing on the Special Watch List “in more than 2 consecutive Annual
[International Religious Freedom] Reports”, “in any 4 Annual Reports”, or “in
more than 1 Annual Report [if the country had previously been designated a
CPC]” would be subject to an automatic redesignation as a CPC. While this
provision included executive discretion to waive the automatic CPC designation
in two of the three triggering situations, it capped this ability at two years.118
More dramatically, the Special Watch List was also drafted in a manner that
would make it applicable to a new category of actors subject to scrutiny under
IRFA: violent nonstate actors (NSAs).
Extending IRFA’s scrutiny to violent NSAs engaging in or tolerating
violations of religious freedom119 signaled one of the most significant policy
changes proposed by Rep. Smith’s Wolf Act. Plainly, the decision to add NSAs
intended to account for organizations such as ISIS and Boko Haram,120
116

USCIRF has long maintained a “watch list” (now designated as Tier 2 countries) that includes
countries where “religious freedom conditions do not rise to the statutory level that would
mandate a CPC designation but require close monitoring due to the nature and extent of violations
of religious freedom engaged in or tolerated by governments.” In 2017, USCIRF’s Tier 2 list
consisted of: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan,
Laos, Malaysia, and Turkey. Frequently Asked Questions, USCIRF, http://www.uscirf.gov/about
-uscirf/frequently-asked-questions#FAQ%206 [https://perma.cc/E9VF-34UA] (last visited on
Dec. 20, 2018).
117
Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2015; and Calling for the Release
of Ukrainian Fighter Pilot Nadiya Savechenko, supra note 43, at 51.
118
Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 402
(2015). The scope of this provision appears to have been restricted to countries only: “The
President may waive the application of clauses (i) or (ii) . . . with respect to a country for up
to 2 years . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).
119
H.R. 1150, § 102.
120
Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2015; and Calling for the Release
of Ukrainian Fighter Pilot Nadiya Savechenko, supra note 43, at 50 (statement Rep. Smith)
(“We see daily headlines of beheadings, kidnappings, mob attacks, and arrests carried out by
ISIS, al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and many other groups.”).
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notorious for their religiously-motivated acts of violence targeting nonconforming Muslims and religious minorities. To justify providing IRFA with
the new ability to formally scrutinize and respond to such non-state actors, H.R.
1150 proffered two key findings. First, it formally recognized121 that “religious
leaders and believers are targeted by . . . violent nonstate actors”122 in addition
to more conventional national security forces. Second, H.R. 1150 found that
such violent NSAs are an expanding force123 responsible for exposing a
significant percentage of the global population to severe restrictions on
freedom of religion and belief.124
With these legislative findings in place, H.R. 1150 sought to apply
IRFA’s existing CPC framework—including its trigger of mandatory
presidential action125—to violent NSAs. To do so, the bill set out a novel definition126 for “violent non-state actor.” 127 To qualify for scrutiny under IRFA,
an NSA would need to be a “nonsovereign entity or group that—(A) exercises
significant political power or influence at a national or international level; and
(B) engages in, finances, or tolerates violations of religious freedom, terrorism,
or violence or discrimination targeting religious minorities.”128 The statute as
introduced provided no guidance on the meaning to be associated with terms
such as “nonsovereign” or “significant political power.”
Using this definition for NSAs as a jump-off point, the bill outlined a
“Statement of Policy Regarding Country of Particular Concern Designation For
Violent Nonstate Actors.” This statement established that U.S. policy would
consider violent NSAs that have engaged in or tolerated violations of religious
freedom as “eligible for designation as countries of particular concern.”129 When
designated as such, the full array of presidential actions—from private demarche
to procurement and contract prohibitions as well as a bar on visas and admission
to the United States130—“should be applicable to [such groups] or individual
121

H.R. 1150, § 407 (acknowledging that “various administrations have made [CPC] designations targeting violent nonstate actors . . . such as the Taliban and Serbian groups carrying
on atrocities against Bosnians”).
122
Id. at § 2.
123
Id. at § 407.
124
Id. at § 2.
125
Id. at § 402 (describing “[p]residential actions in response to particularly severe violations
of religious freedom”).
126
There is no statutory precedent for the definition. The author’s conversations with individuals
involved in the drafting process indicate it was crafted based on a review of academic literature.
127
Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015).
128
Id.
129
Id. at § 407.
130
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, § 405, 112 Stat. 2787,
2806–07 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6445).
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members of such groups.”131 Finally, to strengthen this proposed framework for
dealing with violent NSAs—and to further build up the significance of USCIRF
recommendations—the bill required the president to furnish Congress with
reasons in the event such a group was not listed as a CPC, “particularly if
[USCIRF] made a recommendation for such a designation.”132
A final example underscoring the effort to entrench NSA monitoring
and reporting in IRFA (and to further empower USCIRF) is reflected in the
bill’s proposal to establish a regularly updated “Victims List.” This list, to be
maintained by USCIRF, was envisioned as a new tool for drawing attention
to persons “imprisoned, detained, disappeared” or otherwise harmed because
of their “religious activity or religious freedom advocacy.” Regarding NSAs
specifically, the provision allowed for including on the list those individuals
subjected to harm at the hands of a foreign government or a “violent nonstate
actor that the Commission recommends for designation as a country of
particular concern.”133
Although the new NSA-related provisions represented a major
component of the Wolf Act’s amendments, it bears recalling that the original
omission of nonstate actors from IRFA was not generally considered a major
shortcoming of the statute. In fact, IRFA’s track record suggested that both the
U.S. government and USCIRF found its provisions sufficiently flexible to
designate unrecognized countries and regimes as CPCs despite IRFA’s original
language remaining silent on making such allowances. In any case, as will be
seen below, the operative definition for NSAs and IRFA’s ability to police
them would be subject to much debate and revision before final passage of the
Wolf Act.
Beyond seeking to incorporate NSAs into IRFA’s purview, the Wolf
Act as introduced contained several additional amendments that merit
attention. One set of these changes underscored the effort to inhibit IRFA’s
allowance for executive discretion. First, the act sought to tighten deadlines
surrounding IRFA’s reporting and designation obligations. The issue of delays
and inaction on the part of the executive branch was a longstanding and recognized problem. For example, USCIRF had previously “expressed concern
about the lack of any CPC designations by the Bush State Department between
131

H.R. 1150, §407.
Id. Prior to these changes, while IRFA did mandate “[a]n assessment and description of
the nature and extent of violations of religious freedom in each foreign country, including . . .
religious persecution by . . . non-governmental entities,” it did not explicitly subject such
entities to presidential action. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105292, § 101, 112 Stat. 2787, 2787 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6401).
133
Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 104 (2015).
132

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3314204

Vol. 4:2]

Wolf Act Amendments to the U.S. International Religious Freedom Act

179

November 2006 and January 2009” as well as the failure of the Obama
administration to make timely CPC designations.134 Thus, the amendments
moved to replace vague language calling, for example, on the president to
report and act on countries violating religious freedom “as expeditiously as
practicable”, with fixed deadlines of 90 days from release of the OIRF annual
report.135 Similarly, the new bill required that the president undertake
consultations with a country targeted with serious sanctions within 90 days
rather than “as soon as practicable.”136
Second, the amendments pushed back against the president’s ability to
invoke an indefinite waiver on action against a designated CPC, replacing it
with a maximum duration of 180 days.137 As noted above, nearly half of the
currently designated CPCs are under multi-year presidential waivers that have
shielded them from the imposition of any sanctions action. IRFA enabled this
type of open-ended waiver because its original formulation failed to specify an
expiration or time limit for presidential waivers.138 To this, the Wolf Act added
a “sense of Congress” provision that explicitly condemned the presidential
practice of “ongoing and persistent waivers” as not “fulfill[ing] the purposes”
of IRFA.139
Expanding on the above amendments targeting executive discretion,
the original Wolf Act bill moved to strengthen USCIRF in several notable
ways. First, it sought to reauthorize the Commission until 2021,140 a
significantly lengthier period than afforded by prior Congressional reauthorizations. This push to secure an extended future for the bipartisan watchdog
can be traced to Rep. Frank Wolf’s view that USCIRF, “unlike the State
Department, is unencumbered by the impulse to maintain good bilateral
relations above all else—an impulse which sadly can result in critical issues of
religious freedom being sidelined in the pursuit of broader foreign policy
goals.”141 From this vantage point, protecting USCIRF’s mandate would
ensure that the State Department’s ability to conduct foreign policy would
continue to be “irritated” by IRFA’s demand—as personified by the Comm134

U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT 7–8 (2010).
H.R. 1150, § 401–402.
136
Id. at § 403.
137
Compare § 407 with § 405 of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-292, 112 Stat. 2787, 2787 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6445, 6647) (requiring
the president to take action within 180 days at the maximum).
138
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, §407(a), 112 Stat.
2787, 2787 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6401).
139
Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 405 (2015).
140
Id. at § 205.
141
157 CONG. REC. 854 (2011) (statement of Rep. Frank R. Wolf).
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ission—that religious freedom considerations inform the formulation and
execution of that policy.142 Second, as if to drive home USCIRF’s role in
constraining executive discretion, the Wolf Act also mandated that the
president furnish an explanation in the event the executive branch ignored a
USCIRF recommendation to designate a particular country as a CPC.143
The final pair of original Wolf Act amendments worth noting signaled
efforts to expand IRFA’s ability to sanction individuals for violations of
religious freedom and to guarantee funding levels for religious freedomrelated activities. As noted above, IRFA’s original design provided for the
imposition of sanctions against target countries for violations of religious
freedom. But it also amended the Immigration and Nationality Act to require
the State Department to deny entry to individual foreign government officials
who were “responsible for or directly carried out . . . particularly severe violations of religious freedom.”144 The Wolf Act as introduced sought to
enlarge this latter ability to penalize individuals. Under Section 605, the
proposed bill enabled the president to sanction individuals responsible for
engaging in or tolerating particularly severe violations of religious freedom.
This power, premised on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act,
would be broadly applicable to any foreign person determined by the
President to play “a role in committing, ordering, sponsoring, or materially
142

According to Rep. Smith, “Religious freedom has always been orphaned within the State
Department . . . usually the Foreign Service officer tasked with religious freedom issues is
someone very, very low on the totem poll and the Ambassador, the DCM [Deputy Chief of
Mission] and others see it as an irritant.” Prioritizing International Religious Freedom in U.S.
Foreign Policy, supra note 87, at 25. This view is corroborated by Thomas Farr: “the State
Department views the Commission as an irritant. That it does not pay more than just lip service
to many of its recommendations over the years . . . .” Id. at 80.
143
H.R. 1150, §402.
144
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, §604(a), 112 Stat.
2787, 2814 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6473(a)). In 2005, Narendra Modi, India’s current
prime minister, became the first individual to be denied an entry visa under this provision of
IRFA. The State Department denied Modi’s visa based on riots that occurred in 2002 during
his tenure as head of Gujarat state and resulted in the death of over 1,000 Muslims. For
coverage of this event, see Zahir Janmohamed, U.S. Evangelicals, Indian Expats Teamed Up
to Push Through Modi Visa Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2013), https://india.blogs.nytimes.com
/2013/12/05/u-s-evangelicals-indian-expats-teamed-up-to-push-through-modi-visa-ban/; James
Mann, Why Narendra Modi Was Banned From the U.S., WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2014, 4:26
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-narendra-modi-was-banned-from-the-u-s-1399062
010. USCIRF renewed its call to deny Modi entry to the United States again in 2008, when
he planned to participate in a conference celebrating Gujarati culture. Press Release, USCIRF,
USCIRF Urges Denial of U.S. Visa to Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi (Jul. 8, 2008),
http://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/press-releases/uscirf-urges-denial-us-visa-gujarat-chiefminister-narendra-modi [https://perma.cc/67WH-5CVW].
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supporting systemic, egregious, and ongoing violations of religious freedom”
or who provides “material or other assistance supporting violence or terrorist
acts targeting members of religious groups.”145 Further, it would enable the
president to take a larger range of actions beyond denial of entry, including
prohibiting financial transfers, and the acquisition, holding, or use of any
property by a foreign national.146
Finally, to undergird its effort to revitalize IRFA and place religious
freedom at the center of U.S. foreign policy, the Wolf Act assigned explicit
funding to the mission of promoting freedom of religion. Originally, IRFA
merely amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 provision authorizing the
president to use allocated funds to carry out “programs and activities which
will encourage or promote increased adherence to civil and political rights” to
include a reference to “the right to free religious belief and practice.”147 Under
the changes proposed, “not less than 10 percent” of the amounts made available
for 2016–2021 for the Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF) would be
designated for the specific “promotion of international religious freedom.”148
This funding would be used for grants to groups pursuing legal protections for
religious freedom; the promotion of cultural and societal understanding of
international religious freedom norms; the reduction of religiously motivated
and sectarian violence and extremism; and the reporting and monitoring of
religious freedom violations.149 Further, an additional minimum two percent of
HRDF money would be earmarked for a new fund dedicated to boosting
religious freedom. The Religious Freedom Defense Fund, situated within the
State Department and administered by the IRF Ambassador, would enable the
issuing of grants to:
145

Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 601
(Actions against persons responsible for committing particularly severe violations of
international religious freedom) (as introduced in House, Feb. 27, 2015).
146
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. 95-223, § 203, 91 Stat. 1625,
1626–1627 (1977).
147
22 U.S.C. § 2151(n)(e) (1999) (encouraging the president to use allocated funds “for
studies to identify, and for openly carrying out programs and activities which will encourage
or promote increased adherence to civil and political rights, including the right to free
religious belief and practice, as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”).
148
DRL Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/p/ [https://perma.cc/
9XT7-9JF6] (last visited Dec. 31, 2018) (“The Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF),
established by Congress in 1998, functions as a ‘venture capital fund’ for democracy and
human rights, enabling State to respond quickly and flexibly to changing needs and
opportunities to advance democracy and promote human rights.”). See also Human Rights
and Democracy Fund, 22 U.S.C § 2151(n)(2).
149
H.R. 1150, § 501 (as introduced in House, Feb. 27, 2015).
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Victims of religious freedom abuses and their families to
cover legal and other expenses that may arise from
detention, imprisonment, torture, fines, and other
restrictions; and
Projects to help create and support training of a new
generation of defenders of religious freedom, including
legal and political advocates, and civil society…150

Despite Rep. Smith touting the Wolf Act’s “strong bipartisan
support,”151 even at this early stage in the lawmaking process rumblings of
opposition were apparent. Two months after its introduction, during
subcommittee markup for the bill, Rep. David Cicilline (D-RI) communicated
concerns expressed by the Obama administration regarding the Wolf Act’s
proposed “changes to internal State Department structure,” “potential drains on
democracy funding of other important programs,” and its reauthorization of
USCIRF “without important reforms.”152 Rep. Cicilline’s expressed hope that
these differences could be addressed “as this legislation moves forward” would
set expectations for the next round of House negotiations.153
B. Engrossed in House – May 2016
If the attempt to extend IRFA’s mandate to NSA activity reflected one
of the Wolf Act’s biggest innovations, precisely how this scrutiny would play
out was subject to the biggest modifications before the full House extended its
endorsement to the bill over a year later. First, the revised bill deleted the
finding that 75 percent of the global population lives in countries where either
the government or violent nonstate actors severely restrict the right to the
freedom of religion and belief. More significantly, it overhauled the definition
for nonstate actor to dramatically narrow the range of NSAs that could fall
under IRFA scrutiny. Instead of using the ambiguous term “nonsovereign
entity” the bill required that the NSA “not belong to or ally itself to any
particular country.”154 Further, it required that an NSA exercise significant
150

Id.
H.R. Rep. No. 114-62 (2015) (Comm. Markup) (according to Rep. Smith: “Some 10
Democrats have signed on as cosponsors of the bill, and the lead cosponsor of the bill is Anna
Eshoo . . . We have 80 total sponsors of the bill and the number is growing by the day.”)
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 3 (definitions) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016) (noting House suspended rules and passed bill
by voice vote).
151
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political power and (rather than “or”) the ability to exert influence. Finally, the
new version required that an NSA “often employ[] illegal violence in pursuit
of its objectives.”155 These changes effectively rejected the original bill’s more
flexible, if vague, language capturing a wider swath of NSAs based on
“financ[ing] or tolerat[ing] violations of religious freedom . . . or discrimination
targeting religious minorities.”156 In other words, under the new formulation,
NSAs aiding or tolerating violations or discrimination impacting freedom of
religion or belief but otherwise avoiding violence would no longer be subject
to scrutiny under IRFA. Further, even if an NSA met the higher “illegal
violence” criteria, it would still need to satisfy the definitional tests concerning
“significant political power,” national or international influence, and
independence to fall under IRFA.
Beyond narrowing the operative definition of NSAs that would trigger
IRFA scrutiny, the revised bill also deleted the entire “Statement of Policy
Regarding Country of Particular Concern Designation For Violent Nonstate
Actors.” In doing so, the bill undid the requirement for mandatory presidential
action where an NSA was found to have “engaged in or tolerated violations of
religious freedom.”157 Whereas the original House bill required the president to
act using the full range of sanctions available under IRFA, the revised bill
introduced two significant changes. First, it premised presidential action on a
higher threshold, paralleling the standard applicable to CPCs. Accordingly,
before executive action could be directed against an NSA, it would have to be
found to “have engaged in particularly severe violations of religious freedom”158
and designated an “Entity of Particular Concern” (EPC)159 by the president.
155

Id.
Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 3 (definitions)
(as introduced in House, Feb. 27, 2015).
157
Id. at § 401(Presidential actions in response to violations of religious freedom).
158
H.R. 1150, § 301 (Non-State Actor Designations) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016).
159
Id. This is not the first time the term “entities of particular concern” would appear in
IRFA. The original law employs the term in connection with the requirement to publish IRFA
determinations in the Federal Register. Under the heading “Determinations of Governments,
Officials, and Entities of Particular Concern,” the president is obligated to publish in the
Federal Register “[a]ny designation of a country of particular concern for religious freedom
. . . together with, when applicable and to the extent practicable, the identities of the officials
or entities determined to be responsible for the violations.” International Religious Freedom
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, §408(a)(1), 112 Stat. 2787, 2808 (1998) (codified at 22
U.S.C. § 6448). An EPC designation under the House-revised bill maintains a parallel
presidential obligation to “seek to determine the specific officials or members thereof that
are responsible for the particularly severe violations of religious freedom.” H.R. 1150, § 301
(Non-State Actor Designations) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016).
156
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At the same time, the revised bill retreated from mandating the
president to take statutorily-defined action. Instead, it merely suggested that
the “President should take specific actions to address severe violations of
religious freedom” by EPCs, “including taking actions commensurate to” those
already designated under IRFA.160 Thus, while the revised bill signaled a
laudable effort to integrate a new EPC designation alongside the preexisting
CPC regime, it left the actual post-designation treatment of EPCs adrift. Rather
than transpose CPC provisions governing mandatory action based on a preset
menu of options, the bill discarded requirements for such action as well as the
need to do so within a fixed timeframe.
Perhaps to compensate for discarding deadlines and mandatory action
against NSAs, the House-revised Wolf Act added a new “sense of Congress”
provision recommending the Secretary of State work with Congress to “create
new political, financial, and diplomatic tools to address severe violations of
religious freedom by non-state actors” and to “update the actions the President
can take” under these EPC scenarios in IRFA.161 It also newly required the
President furnish Congress with a “report detailing the reasons”162 for any EPC
designation, that the Annual IRF Report’s executive summary include any
country within which an EPC is located,163 and further, that any designation of
an EPC be published in the Federal Register.164
The downgraded emphasis on addressing NSAs violating religious
freedom is similarly evident in revisions to the Special Watch List proposal.
The Watch List was originally conceived to establish a new tier system under
IRFA for reporting on religious freedom violations. The House-approved bill,
however, rejected inclusion of NSAs on the Watch List. Thus, it signaled that
only countries tolerating serious violations of religious freedom falling short of
the CPC standard would be eligible for inclusion on the list.165 In addition to
scrapping the possibility of using this tool to place NSAs on notice for religious
160

H.R. 1150, §301 (Non-state Actor Designations) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016)
(emphasis added).
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id. at § 102 (Annual Report on International Religious Freedom).
164
Id. at § 305. The Federal Register published the first set of EPC designations in March
2018. Secretary of State’s Determination Under the Frank R. Wolf International Religious
Freedom Act of 2016, 83 Fed. Reg. 10545 (Mar. 8, 2018) (designating as EPCs the following
NSAs: al-Nusra Front, al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qa’ida, al-Shabab, Boko
Haram, ISIS, ISIS-Khorasan, and the Taliban).
165
Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 102
(Annual Report on International Religious Freedom) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016).
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freedom violations falling short of the “particularly severe” standard, deleting
NSAs from the watch-list also meant that such entities would no longer be
subject to automatic EPC status if they appeared on the list in more than two
consecutive IRF annual reports.166 Additional amendments impacting the
Watch List provision also resulted in limiting an automatic CPC designation
only to those countries appearing on the list in “more than two consecutive
Annual Reports.”167
One exception to the revised bill’s rollback of provisions targeting NSAs
can be seen in the decision to retain the proposal to create and maintain a list of
victims harmed for their religious activity or religious freedom advocacy. By
preserving this provision, the House saved USCIRF’s new mandate to report on
individuals detained, disappeared or otherwise targeted by a “non-state actor that
the Commission recommends for designation as an entity of particular concern
for religious freedom.”168 Still, USCIRF would need to show that any listed NSA
satisfied the more rigorous EPC standard established under the House version
before it could add any impacted individual to the victims list.
Additional modifications that occurred at this stage of the legislative
process are equally significant because they signal a wider downgrading of the
tenor and thrust of the IRFA amendments as originally proposed. For example,
the bill approved by the House deleted major enhancements intended to boost
the status and function of the Ambassador at Large for Religious Freedom (IRF)
and the Office on International Religious Freedom (OIRF). Although the Houseapproved bill opted to preserve the IRF Ambassador’s new direct reporting line
to the Secretary of State, it discarded the relocation requirement, preferring to
keep OIRF within the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor. In place of this relocation, the engrossed bill substituted a nonbinding
“sense of Congress” provision calling on the Secretary of State merely to
“consider elevating” OIRF and the IRF Ambassador “to the Office of the
Secretary, similar to other Ambassador-at-Large positions that now report
166

Id. at § 302 (listing presidential actions in response to particularly severe violations of
religious freedom).
167
Id.
168
Id. at § 104 (including prisoner lists and issue briefs on religious freedom concerns). Although
the House-revised bill retained the new prisoner list provision, it simultaneously discarded the
original bill’s attempt to make it “be the policy of the United States Government”—rather than
IRFA’s existing “sense of Congress”—that “all officials . . . shall promote” increased advocacy
on such issues during meetings with foreign dignitaries. Compare Frank R. Wolf International
Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 104 (providing prisoner lists and issue briefs
on religious freedom concerns), as Introduced in House, Feb. 27, 2015 and Frank R. Wolf
International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 104 (including prisoner lists and
issue briefs on religious freedom concerns), as Engrossed in House, May 16, 2016.
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directly to the Secretary.”169 Equally revealing, the bill deleted the provision that
would have elevated the ambassador’s status to “the principal advisor” to the
president regarding matters affecting religious freedom abroad, permitting this
jump in status only with respect to advising the Secretary of State.170
Coupled with the decision to eschew upgrading the organizational
status of OIRF and the IRF Ambassador, the House-approved bill also clawed
back the ambassador’s new responsibilities for integrating IRF policy. Instead
of robust and defined duties extending into the work of various federal
departments and agencies, the House-approved version called generally for
“integrat[ing] United States international religious freedom policies and
strategies into the foreign policy efforts of the United States.”171 While this
change might appear cosmetic in nature, the lack of specificity may make
future integration efforts more difficult and subject to administrative
impediments. Perhaps as a token to soften these blows, the House-approved
bill promised to enlarge OIRF staffing from the originally proposed 20 to 25
full-time staff. Still, this change came at the expense of deleting the requirement that OIRF include a senior director and downgrading the language on
representation funds from “levels at least equal to” to “in amounts comparable
to those provided to other Ambassadors.”172
Further illustrating the overall downgrading of the proposed IRFA
amendments, the House-approved bill rejected provisions intended to boost
religious freedom advocacy within the National Security Council (NSC). First,
the House scrapped the requirement that the president appoint a “Special Adviser
for Global Religion Engagement and International Religious Freedom” to the
NSC.173 In place of mandating this appointment, the House-approved bill simply
169

H.R. 1150, § 101 (Office on International Religious Freedom; Ambassador at Large for
International Religious Freedom) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016). For example, see
Bureaus/Offices Reporting Directly to the Secretary, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.
gov/s/index.htm [https://perma.cc/G29P-AHGA] (last visited Dec. 31, 2018) and Special Envoys,
Representatives, Coordinators, AM. FOREIGN SERVICE ASS’N, http://www.afsa.org/specialenvoys-representatives-and-coordinators [https://perma.cc/N27N-U33K] (last visited Nov. 20,
2018). Note that the number of these special representatives is poised to drop. Colum Lynch &
Robbie Gramer, State Department Reorganization Eliminates Climate, Muslim and Syria Envoys,
FOR. POL. (Aug. 29, 2017), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/29/state-department-reorgani
zation-eliminates-climate-muslim-and-syria-envoys/ [https://perma.cc/GFW4-YJ65].
170
H.R. 1150, § 101 (Office on International Religious Freedom; Ambassador at Large for
International Religious Freedom) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016).
171
Id.
172
Compare with H.R. 1150, § 101 (Office on International Religious Freedom; Ambassador
at Large for International Religious Freedom) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016).
173
H.R. 1150, § 301 (Special Adviser for Global Religion Engagement and International Religious Freedom; Interagency Policy Committees) (as introduced in House, Feb. 27, 2015) (noting
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reverted to IRFA’s original “sense of Congress” formulation recommending
appointment of a “Special Adviser to the President on International Religious
Freedom.” At the same time, it expanded slightly on IRFA’s originally
envisioned role for the NSC adviser by, for example, suggesting the position
include assisting the IRF Ambassador “to coordinate international religious
freedom policies and strategies throughout the executive branch.”174
Second, the House-approved bill also discarded the provision that
sought to establish two new NSC-based interagency policy committees—one
on “International Religious Freedom and Global Religion Engagement” and
another on “Religion, International Religious Freedom, and National
Security.” Taken together, these revisions effectively ended efforts to secure
a reinvigorated role for religious freedom within the NSC. At the same time,
they served to diminish the elevated status afforded to the IRF Ambassador
under the original bill.175 As if to cement the rejection of a more central
policy-making role for the IRF Ambassador within the NSC, the House’s
revised bill tepidly added (as part of the mandate holder’s new coordination
duties) that the ambassador “should participate in any interagency processes
on issues in which the promotion of international religious freedom policy
can advance United States national security interests, including in democracy
promotion, stability, security, and development globally.”176
The House approved bill also undid efforts to enhance IRFA’s
sanctioning ability and to secure financing to promote religious freedom. In place
of the original bill’s explicit grant of authority to sanction individuals violating
religious freedom, the House directed the Secretary of State simply to establish
and maintain a “Designated Persons List” of foreign individuals who are
sanctioned, through visa denials, financial sanctions, or other measures, because
that the special adviser would “coordinate international religious freedom policies and global
religion engagement strategies . . . and develop policy recommendations.”).
174
Compare International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, § 301, 112
Stat. 2787, 2800 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6436) (Special Adviser on International
Religious Freedom) with Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150,
114th Cong. § 201 (Special Adviser for International Religious Freedom) (as engrossed in
House, May 16, 2016).
175
Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong § 301
(Special Adviser for Global Religion Engagement and International Religious Freedom;
Interagency Policy Committees) (as introduced in House, Feb. 27, 2015). The original bill
tasked the former committee (chaired by the IRF Ambassador) with developing “a global
strategy to advance international religious freedom”, and the latter committee (co-chaired by
the IRF Ambassador and Deputy National Security Advisor) with identifying “potential
national security risks related to the absence of religious freedom globally.” Id.
176
H.R. 1150, § 101 (Office on International Religious Freedom; Ambassador at Large for
International Religious Freedom) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016).
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of their responsibility for “ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing
particularly severe violations of freedom [sic] religion.”177 As part of this
obligation, the Secretary would provide Congress with regular updates to the list,
including a “description of the actions taken . . . in response to” those individual
included therein.178 In this case, negotiation and passage of the Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act provides a likely explanation for
the decision to delete the express ability to impose sanctions on individual
government officials for violations of religious freedom under IRFA.179
Coupled with this, the House retreated from mandating minimum
funding for the protection and advancement of international religious
freedom through the State Department’s Human Rights and Democracy Fund
and the Religious Freedom Defense Fund. Rather than preserve the State
Department’s obligation to fund religious freedom promotion activities at
guaranteed levels, the approved bill opted instead to express a nonbinding
“sense of Congress” that funding ought to be pegged at such levels.180
Finally, the House took aim at provisions intended to fortify USCIRF
and to reduce executive discretion. In the first instance, it discarded all
provisions of the original H.R. 1150 bill directed at reforming USCIRF,
including its reauthorization until 2021.181 At the same time, it further undercut
the Commission’s stature (and the effort to reign in executive discretion) by
deleting the proposal requiring the president to explain any decision to forgo a
CPC designation where USCIRF had made a prior recommendation supporting
such a designation.182 Similarly, the House approved bill rejected at least some
177

Id. at § 501 (Designated Persons List for Particularly Severe Violations of Religious
Freedom).
178
Id.
179
The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act enables the president to impose
sanctions “based on credible evidence” that a foreign person is “responsible for extrajudicial
killings, torture, or other gross violations of internationally recognized human rights
committed against individuals in any foreign country who seek . . . to obtain, exercise,
defend, or promote internationally recognized human rights and freedoms, such as the
freedoms of religion . . .” Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, Pub. L. 114328, § 1263, 130 Stat. 2533 (2016) (codified at 23 U.S.C. § 2656) (Authorization of
Imposition of Sanctions).
180
Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 401
(Assistance for Promoting Religious Freedom) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016).
181
The House approved version of H.R. 1150 entirely deleted Title II of the bill as introduced,
the section that addressed reform and reauthorization of the Commission.
182
Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2015, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong.
§ 402 (Presidential actions in response to particularly severe violations of religious freedom)
(as introduced in House, Feb. 27, 2015). As noted, this obligation to explain non-designation
would represent a check on executive discretion.
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of the amendments proposed in 2015 that intended to impose stricter deadlines
for action and limits on the duration of presidential waivers. For example, the
new bill eliminated amendments imposing 90-day deadlines for the president
to act in response to countries violating religious freedom (though not in a
particularly severe manner) and to engage in consultations with those countries
subject to such action under section 401 of IRFA. Perhaps more significantly,
rather than endorse the suggested 180-day limit on such CPC waivers,183 the
new bill restored the president’s authority to seek an indefinite waiver after
expiry of an initial 180-day waiver period. The president could activate this
second waiver “for any additional period of time after the 180-day period” by
providing a determination that the “respective foreign government has ceased
the [relevant] violations” or “the exercise of such authority is important to the
national interests of the United States.”184 Perhaps to offset the return of an
indefinite waiver, the approved House bill preserved a “sense of Congress”
provision asserting that “ongoing and persistent waivers of the application of
[sanction actions under IRFA §405(a) ¶ 9-15] do not fulfill the purposes of this
Act”, and reasoning that “because the promotion of religious freedom is a
compelling interest of United States foreign policy, the President [and others]
should seek to find ways to address existing violations, on a case-by-case basis,
through the actions specified in [IRFA § 405].”185
From the analysis above, the House-approved version of the Wolf Act
resulted in significant revisions to diminish the scrutiny of NSAs and undo
other major efforts to boost IRFA’s effectiveness and centrality in U.S.
foreign policy. Still, it retained some positive amendments and introduced at
least one critical improvement. First, the bill preserved most of the provisions
setting out new mandatory training requirements for the State Department. It
did opt to downgrade the obligation to share training materials with a detailed
list of federal departments and agencies in favor of a suggestion the materials
should be made available to all other Federal agencies. However, the only
other changes to this amendment related to minor revisions to language.
Second, the House-approved bill preserved some of the efforts to hold the
president to a more defined time table with respect to reporting on CPCs. For
example, it preserved the call for 90-day time limits on presidential review
and determination of CPCs and on reporting to Congress action flowing from
183

H.R. 1150, § 405 (Presidential Waiver) (as introduced in House, Feb. 27, 2015)
H.R. 1150, § 304 (Presidential Waiver) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016).
185
Compare H.R. 1150, § 405 (Presidential Waiver) (as introduced in House, Feb. 27, 2015)
with International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. §304 (Presidential Waiver) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016).
184
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such designations.186 Third, the House maintained the “sense of Congress”
provision calling on the president’s annual national security strategy report
to “promote international religious freedom as a foreign policy and national
security priority.”187 Finally, the House-approved bill also endorsed the new
Victims List amendment, making only slight changes to accommodate the
shift away from violent NSAs to the newly introduced EPC system.
Perhaps the most notable improvement to the original bill related to a
revision of IRFA’s definition of the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion. The edits introduced in the House-approved bill expressly
recognized that this right includes protection of “theistic and non-theistic
beliefs as well as the right not to profess or practice any religion.”188 This
finding is further strengthened elsewhere in the bill by acknowledging that “the
specific targeting of non-theists, humanists, and atheists . . . [is often
particularly widespread, systematic, and heinous] . . . in regions where nonstate actors exercise significant political power and influence.”189 Incorporating this revision represented no small achievement. According to the
American Humanist Association, the four-year effort to “include inclusive
language protecting non-believers,” signaled “a significant step toward full
acceptance and inclusion for non-religious individuals.”190 The move also
served to bring IRFA more closely into line with the international
understanding of the scope of freedom of religion or belief. According to the
UN Human Rights Committee, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion “protects theistic, non- theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right
not to profess any religion or belief. The terms “belief” and “religion” are to be
186

See Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2015, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong.
§402 (Presidential actions in response to particularly severe violations of religious freedom)
(as introduced in House, Feb. 27, 2015); see also Frank R. Wolf International Religious
Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. §302 (Presidential actions in response to particularly
severe violations of religious freedom) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016). The original
version of IRFA offered little in the way of clear deadlines, appearing to provide the president
with a year to review country status and make determinations, and similarly, requiring only
that the president notify congress “as soon as practicable after the designation is made.” H.R.
1150, §402(b) (Presidential actions in response to particularly severe violations of religious
freedom) (as introduced in House, Feb. 27, 2015.
187
H.R. 1150, § 703 (Sense of congress regarding national security strategy to promote
religious freedom through United States foreign policy) (as engrossed in House, May 16,
2016).
188
H.R. 1150, § 2 (Findings; Policy) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016).
189
Id.
190
Obama Signs Modified Religious Freedom Law, AMS. UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH
& STATE (Feb. 2017), https://www.au.org/church-state/february-2017-church-state/au-bulletin/
obama-signs-modified-religious-freedom-law [https://perma.cc/ST4L-HR5A].
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broadly construed.”191 Among other things, this means that the freedom to
“have or to adopt” a religion or belief “necessarily entails the freedom to choose
a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or belief
with another or to adopt atheistic views.”192
C. Senate Revisions – December 2016
After gaining the House’s approval, the Wolf Act proceeded to
deliberations in the Senate. These negotiations, ultimately leading to a version
of the bill approved in December 2016, brought about further revisions to the
House approved text discussed above. Here again, much of the focus for
changes revolved around how to implement the new system for monitoring
NSA-based violations of religious freedom. On one hand, the Senate preserved
the review, designation and reporting regime193 for EPCs, the inclusion of
EPCs in the IRF annual report executive summary,194 and the provisions
relating to USCIRF preparing and maintaining a list of victims of EPCs.195 On
the other hand, despite these carryovers, the Senate took steps to further limit
the potential impact of IRFA’s new NSA-related provisions.
For example, the Senate moved to further narrow the Wolf Act’s
operative definition for NSAs. To this end, it preserved the requirements of
significant political power, independence from states, and the employment of
violence in pursuit of its objectives.196 But, it also now required that NSAs
exercise territorial control rather than “exert influence at a national or international level.” Though the addition of territorial control arguably lent greater
clarity to the NSA definition than the vague notion of “exert influence”, it still
left much open to interpretation. For example, how much territory is required,
and for how long a duration must it be “controlled”? From this perspective, any
clarity gained by the change likely will come at the expense of further reducing
the number of NSAs potentially eligible for consideration under IRFA.
The Senate’s revisions also included two significant changes to further
lessen the likelihood and consistency of presidential action against an NSA
designated as an EPC. First, the Senate bill entrenched the House language
191

Human Rights Committee, General Comment on Freedom of Thought, Conscience and
Religion, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, at ¶ 2, (1993).
192
Id. at ¶ 5.
193
Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. §301 (Nonstate Actor Designations) (as engrossed in Senate, Dec. 10, 2016).
194
Id. at § 102 (Annual Report on International Religious Freedom).
195
Id. at § 104 (Prisoner Lists and Issue Briefs on Religious Freedom Concerns).
196
Id. at § 3 (Definitions) (as engrossed in Senate, Dec. 10, 2016).
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scrapping the requirement of presidential action against EPCs. In particular, it
provided that the “President should take specific actions, when practicable, to
address [EPC] violations of religious freedom.”197 With this modification, the
Senate endorsed the House decision to downgrade presidential action from
mandatory to optional (“shall take” to “should take”), and further enabled the
president to waive off taking any EPC-targeted action in the event he or she
deemed it “impracticable.” Coupled with this, the Senate also did away with
requiring presidential action targeting EPCs to be based on a pre-approved
inventory of sanctions already provided under IRFA § 405. In doing so, the
Senate left as open-ended—and thus unpredictable—the potential types of
executive action the president might take. Viewed in their entirety, these
revisions appeared to further expand presidential discretion and make the
likelihood of any EPC action even more remote.
Perhaps to counterbalance the additional attrition to IRFA’s new NSA
provisions, the Senate preserved the “sense of Congress” that the Secretary
of State should work “to create new political, financial, and diplomatic tools”
to deal with violations of religious freedom committed by NSAs. To this, it
added a new provision recommending that any presidential action targeting
an EPC “should also involve high-level diplomacy with the government of
the country in which the non-state actor is operating.”198 Presumably, this
diplomatic engagement might serve to generate an impact on or consequence
for the EPC without the need for direct U.S. action.
Looking beyond the Senate’s NSA/EPC-related changes, the new bill
continued the retreat away from the vision set out in the original Wolf Act by
declining to support additional House-approved amendments intended to
strengthen IRFA. While the Senate endorsed the 90-day reporting deadlines
introduced in the House version, it deleted the provision requiring countries
appearing on the newly created Special Watch List for two consecutive years
to be automatically designated as CPCs. Therefore, moving forward, these
countries could be placed on the Watch List and remain there indefinitely.199
What implications this may have in practice remain to be seen. However, by
removing the provision, the Senate rejected at least part of the rationale for
establishing a second tier of scrutiny under IRFA. Without the automatic CPC
escalation after two years, countries on the Special Watch List arguably are
197

Id. at § 301 (Non-State Actor Designations) (as engrossed in Senate, Dec. 10, 2016)
(emphasis added).
198
Id.
199
Compare Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. §
302 (Presidential actions in response to particularly severe violations of religious freedom) (as
engrossed in Senate, Dec. 10, 2016) with Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act,
H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. at § 302 (Presidential actions in response to particularly severe
violations of religious freedom) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016).
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being put on notice that nothing in particular may happen to their status or
standing with the United States in the face of violations of religious freedom
that fall below the threshold of “particularly severe.”
The Senate also took aim at the IRF Ambassador and IRF Office,
further undercutting efforts to boost the role and stature of these institutional
actors. The Senate version deleted the nonbinding “sense of Congress”
provision recommending that the IRF Ambassador and IRF office be elevated
“to the Office of the Secretary, similar to other Ambassador at Large
positions.”200 At the same time, it rejected provisions designed to secure the
IRF Office’s operational capacity. Specifically, it replaced the explicit House
requirement that OIRF have “at least 25 full-time equivalent staff positions”201
with a far vaguer commitment of “appropriate staff for the Office, including
full-time equivalent positions.”202 To soften this blow, a new “sense of
Congress” provision was added to the effect “that maintaining an adequate
staffing level at the Office, such as was in place during fiscal year 2016, is
necessary for the Office to carry out its important work.”203
Further weakening the institutional actors advocating for religious
freedom within the U.S. foreign policy-making process, the Senate diluted
what remained of the envisioned NSC special adviser on IRF. The revised
Senate bill deleted the House-backed “sense of Congress” provision that
communicated an explicit, enlarged status for the special adviser position,
including the responsibility for making policy recommendations. Instead, the
Senate provision simply explained—albeit removing the nonbinding “sense of
Congress” formulation—that the advisor (if appointed) would “assist the
Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom to coordinate
international religious freedom policies and strategies.”204
200

Compare H.R. 1150, §101 (Office on International Religious Freedom; Ambassador at
Large for International Religious Freedom) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016) with H.R.
1150, § 101 (Office on International Religious Freedom; Ambassador at Large for
International Religious Freedom) (as engrossed in Senate, Dec. 10, 2016).
201
H.R. 1150, § 101 (Office on International Religious Freedom; Ambassador at Large for
International Religious Freedom) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016).
202
H.R. 1150, § 101(a)(3) (Office of International Religious Freedom; Ambassador at Large
for International Religious Freedom) (as engrossed in Senate, Dec. 10, 2016) (emphasis
added). This arguably is an improvement on the original IRFA language which provided that
“[t]he Secretary of State shall provide the Ambassador at Large with such funds as may be
necessary for the hiring of staff for the Office, for the conduct of investigations by the Office,
and for necessary travel to carry out the provisions of this section.” Id.
203
Id.
204
Compare H.R. 1150, §201 (Special Adviser for International Religious Freedom) (as
engrossed in Senate, Dec. 10, 2016) with H.R. 1150, § 201 (Special Adviser for International
Religious Freedom) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016).
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The Senate also introduced subtle changes to the provisions governing
mandatory training of State Department personnel and the funding of religious
freedom promotion activities. With respect to training, the Senate bill appeared
to preserve its mandatory nature, as well as the one-year time frame for
initiating a curriculum, the personnel required to participate, and the specific
courses that would incorporate religious freedom training. However, it
modified House language directing that the National Foreign Affairs Training
Center “shall begin mandatory training on religious freedom for all Foreign
Service officers . . . .” Instead, it provided that the training center “conduct
training on religious freedom for all Foreign Service officers . . . .”205 Further,
it deleted language specifying that training “be a separate, independent, and
required segment” of the courses designated.
The Senate also transferred the obligation to develop a training
curriculum from the Secretary of State to the IRF ambassador, directing that
the ambassador “shall make recommendations to the Secretary of State
regarding a curriculum for the training of United States Foreign Service
officers.”206 In addition, the new bill restored previously deleted language
regarding the sharing of training materials. Rather than merely suggest that
the “curriculum and training materials developed . . . should be made available to all other Federal Agencies,” the Senate version reverted to a more
mandatory and detailed formulation. Borrowing from the bill as originally
introduced, it provided that the curriculum and materials “shall be shared with
the United States Armed Forces and other Federal departments and agencies
with personnel who are stationed overseas, as appropriate.”207
With respect to funding activities promoting international religious
freedom, the Senate opted to preserve the provision’s noncompulsory “sense
of Congress” formulation. However, it modified the House proposal suggesting the “Department of State should make available” minimum amounts from
the Human Rights and Democracy Fund for such activities and for the
establishment of a Religious Freedom Defense Fund. Instead, it recommended
that the “President should request sufficient appropriations from Congress to
support” these activities.208
Despite the numerous modifications reducing the overall scope of the
draft Wolf Act, the Senate still retained several key proposed amendments
contained in the House version. First, it left intact the provisions governing the
205
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(Training for foreign service officers) (as engrossed in Senate, Dec. 10, 2016).
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new Designated Persons List for Particularly Severe Violations of Religious
Freedom, only making changes focused on streamlining language. It preserved
the obligation for the Secretary of State to maintain and update the list, as well
as the requirement to provide Congress with reports on updates to the list every
180 days. The preservation of this list in the draft bill signaled the possibility
for a more active but tailored use of targeted action intended to punish
individuals responsible for particularly severe violations of freedom of
religion.209 Additionally, this reporting requirement holds the potential for
providing Congress with a new tool for measuring how seriously the State
Department is taking its obligation to protect and promote religious freedom.
In addition, the Senate maintained the “sense of Congress” provision
suggesting that the president’s annual national security strategy report should
“promote international religious freedom as a foreign policy and national
security priority” in part because it “protects other, related human rights, and
advances democracy outside the United States.”210 This provision traced back
to H.R. 1150 as originally introduced nearly two years earlier.
The Senate also preserved new House language incorporating explicit
protection for theistic and non-theistic views under the umbrella of freedom of
religion or belief. In addition, it retained the creation of a Victims List to be
maintained by USCIRF. According to this provision, the Commission would
publicize a list of individual victims harmed by governments and NSAs
USCIRF has recommended for CPC and EPC designation respectively.
The most notable addition provided in the Senate version of the Wolf
Act came in the form of a new finding that a “policy or practice of routinely
denying applications for visas for religious workers in a country can be
indicative of a poor state of religious freedom in that country.”211 This finding
was supplemented by a new “sense of Congress” statement recommending that
the “United States Government should seek to reverse any such policy by
reviewing the entirety of the bilateral relationship between such country and
the United States.”212
D. Public Law 114-281: Outcome of Congressional Negotiations
Shortly after the dust of negotiations in Congress settled, President
Obama signed the Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act,
enacting the most extensive changes to IRFA since its inception nearly two
209
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decades earlier. Although the final law fell far short of its original vision, it did
pick up a handful of improvements along the way. Most notably, while the
provisions governing the ability of IRFA to scrutinize NSAs benefitted from
significant clarification, they were also subject to much claw back and
attenuation. Representatives Ed Royce and Chris Smith initially lauded the
proposed IRFA amendments for targeting groups that “have turned religious
intolerance into a murderous force of global instability”213 and were responsible
for “some of the most egregious religious freedom violations.”214 But by the
time the Senate completed its revisions, much of the thunder behind the soughtafter ability to identify and sanction NSAs—including the requirement that the
president take defined actions against EPCs and the inclusion of NSAs on the
new Special Watch List—had either been significantly diminished or altogether
deleted from the bill. The provisions that remain are likely to generate
interpretational confusion and conflict that risk further clouding the
effectiveness and consistency of any EPC outcomes. These ambiguities impact
many obvious but decisive questions. For example, when does an NSA exert
“significant” political power? What amount of territorial control is necessary?
What degree of independence is sufficient to demonstrate autonomy from a
sovereign government? How much violence must an NSA exert, and relatedly,
what NSA actions will rise to the level of “severe” for an EPC designation?
Finally, what guidance ought to apply concerning the design of any presidential
actions to be taken against any designated EPCs?
Examining the final Wolf Act more generally betrays the same
overarching tendency to delete or otherwise reduce the potential effectiveness
of the various provisions originally proposed. As noted above, the effort to
place a cap on the duration of the president’s ability to waive mandatory action
against CPCs did not make it into the final law. Failing to secure this
amendment likely will perpetuate chronic CPC-designated states continuing to
remain under an indefinite waiver based on “important national interest.”
Related to this, Congress undid other efforts to place a check on executive
discretion. For example, by rejecting provisions intended to secure USCIRF’s
extended reauthorization and requiring the president to explain any decision to
forgo a CPC designation where USCIRF had made a prior recommendation,
the final Wolf Act declined to scale back the executive discretion that has come
to define IRFA over its twenty years of implementation.
Similarly, Congress dismantled proposals intended to better integrate
religious freedom into U.S. foreign policy. It rejected requiring the president
to appoint an NSC adviser on international religious freedom and the creation
of two new NSC interagency committees that would have provided a central
213
214
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policy-input role for the IRF Ambassador. Given IRFA’s history, it is
unlikely that such an NSC appointment will occur without more than a “sense
of Congress” recommendation supporting it. Coupled with this, Congress
also rejected the small but telling proposal to upgrade the IRF ambassador’s
role from “a” principal advisor to “the” principal advisor to the president on
religious freedom issues.
Further undercutting IRFA’s institutional structures, Congress eschewed relocating the IRF office and ambassador to the Office of the Secretary of
State. So powerful was the unwillingness to situate the IRF office within the
Office of the Secretary, that the Senate even struck the House’s proposed
solution, which simply relegated the OIRF move to a nonbinding “sense of
Congress” recommendation. The Senate’s deletion of this compromise
provision was made even starker by the fact that it simultaneously rejected the
House’s justification for the move. According to the House, the relocation
would “demonstrate both the strategic importance of international religious
freedom policy within the State Department bureaucracy and show persecuted
religious groups globally that the U.S. gives priority to the protection and
promotion of international religious freedom.”215 Together with these telling
omissions, the final Wolf Act likewise rejected clear statutory guarantees
governing staffing and funding levels for OIRF and representational funds for
the ambassador.
The Senate also diluted the primary function of the newly minted
Special Watch List by deleting the mandatory escalation to CPC status for
countries remaining on the Watch List for two years. With this decision, it
finished the job started by the House, which had already moved to delete the
inclusion of NSAs on the list. As it stands, the new tier system under IRFA may
give rise to a situation whereby a country falling just below the threshold of
particularly severe violations of freedom religion remains on the Watch List
without any imminent consequence or real impetus to engage diplomatically to
resolve or mitigate violations.
Still, viewed in its entirety, the Wolf Act does hold out some potential
for at least a partial revival of IRFA’s mandate. First, IRFA now enables the
designation of EPCs and—though not mandatory—formally opens the door
to presidential measures targeting these violent nonstate actors. Second, the
IRF ambassador is now empowered to report directly to the Secretary of
State, creating at least one significant opening for advocacy and dialogue that
potentially places religious freedom issues alongside other core foreign
policy concerns. Cementing this, the ambassador is also newly designated as
215
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“the” principal advisor to the Secretary of State on matters affecting religious
freedom abroad. Third, the final amendments leave intact major provisions
related to training State Department officials, a long-sought after objective of
USCIRF and others.216 These new training requirements amend the Foreign
Service Act to include mandatory “training on religious freedom for all
Foreign Service officers, including all entry level officers.” They further
empower the IRF Ambassador, in consultation with USCIRF, to make
recommendations to the Secretary of State regarding the nature of the
curriculum, including “how United States international religious freedom
policy should be carried out in practice by United States diplomats and other
Foreign Service officers.”217 If this training curriculum is substantive and
executed effectively, it will address one of the longest-standing criticisms
regarding implementation of IRFA.
Similarly confirming the Congress’ readiness—if incrementally—to
buttress the effectiveness of IRFA, the final law incorporates firm deadlines
for presidential reporting and designating of CPCs. These new deadlines
signal Congress’ intent to police IRFA’s operation more closely and close
loopholes that previously had diminished the effectiveness of the reporting
mechanism by tolerating periods of either late or altogether missed reporting
and designation. Likewise, creation of a new tier system under IRFA through
the Special Watch List furnishes the president with the ability to draw more
nuanced distinctions among those states falling short of CPC status.
Moreover, even though a state’s inclusion on the Watch List no longer comes
with the built-in specter of looming sanction, if harnessed effectively, it may
still serve to put states on notice and induce diplomatic engagement focused
on improving religious freedom conditions.218
Lastly, the Wolf Act operates to clarify and deepen IRFA’s
understanding of freedom of religion and provide tools for more consistently
keeping the spotlight on victims of religious freedom violations. With respect
216

As Hertzke concluded ten years ago, “efforts to strengthen the law seem warranted.
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to the scope of freedom of religion, moving forward, IRFA now explicitly
recognizes that the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion
includes protection for the “non-theistic . . . .beliefs and the right not to
profess or practice any religion.”219 It also identifies a “policy or practice of
routinely denying applications for visas for religious workers” as indicative
of a potentially “poor state of religious freedom” in a given country.220
Finally, with respect to keeping a spotlight on victims of religious freedom
violations and flagging violators, the Wolf Act introduced new, if imperfect,
tools. Most notably, the Victims List, managed by USCIRF,221 and the
Designated Persons List, managed by the State Department, hold new
potential for naming and shaming as well as for deterring states from
violating religious freedom norms from the outset.
CONCLUSION
The Wolf Act obtained the unopposed endorsement of the House and
Senate as well as the approval of President Barak Obama. However, this
moment of bipartisan buy-in came at the expense of casting off or
downgrading several significant provisions contained in the bill’s original
text. In the end, negotiations over the Wolf Act amendments to IRFA
underscore the extent to which the United States’ promotion of international
religious freedom remains a contested area. Despite assurances that the Act
helps ensure “that defending religious freedom remains at the core of our
engagement…and that we have the most effective policies in place to be
successful,”222 the failure to adopt key reforms signals a continuing unease
with fully integrating religious freedom promotion into U.S. foreign policy.
The ambivalent outcome hanging over the Wolf Act is encapsulated
in how Congress opted to address the challenge of violent nonstate actors
(NSAs). IRFA now includes a framework for identifying violent NSAs
committing violations of religious freedom and enabling the president to
designate those engaging in particularly severe violations as “Entities of
Particular Concern” (EPC). However, while it may be tempting to draw a
parallel between IRFA’s sanction-triggering “Country of Particular Concern”
(CPC) designation and this new EPC designation, the similarity is superficial
at best. As the legislative history assessed above demonstrates, in the quest
219
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to secure passage of the Wolf Act, Congressional negotiations stripped much
of the substance intended to mirror the CPC regime from the new provisions
applicable to nonstate actors. In place of a system that defines clear outcomes
for EPCs, IRFA has been left with a framework riddled with ambiguities
virtually guaranteeing uncertainty of outcome. Not only will it be difficult to
consistently identify NSAs that qualify for scrutiny under IRFA, but the
president will not be obligated to act against those designated as EPCs.
The same ambivalence is manifested elsewhere in the amendments. For
example, the final Wolf Act made only incremental improvements to the status
of the IRF Ambassador and the IRF Office, and stripped efforts to secure
USCIRF’s extended reauthorization. These claw backs functioned to preserve
executive discretion and reject other major changes intended to drive home the
promotion of international religious freedom as a central component of U.S.
foreign policy. At the same time, Congress did authorize mandatory religious
freedom training for State Department officials. This training, if effectively
designed and implemented, should have an overall impact on better integrating
religious freedom concerns within the nation’s larger foreign policy enterprise.223 Likewise, new tools such as the Designated Persons List and Victims
List will provide IRFA with new levers of engagement with recalcitrant states
and nonstate actors alike. However, the Special Watch List system intended to
put states and NSAs on notice—and backed by a tangible potential for CPC
designation—ultimately fell appreciably short of the original vision set out in
early 2015. Finally, while IRFA now includes the express recognition that
freedom of religion includes protection for non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, it
remains beset with unenforceable “sense of Congress” provisions. These provisions arguably set the stage for potentially more muscular future action by
Congress. However, the persistence of IRFA’s original “sense of” provisions and
their continued non-enforcement dampens the likelihood of such an outcome.
Whether these overdue amendments to IRFA will engender meaningful
changes to the status quo will depend on a variety of elements. First, whether
the newly appointed IRF ambassador can effectively assert the office’s new
223
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responsibilities and profile; second, whether the new Secretary of State elects to
vigorously implement the Wolf Act’s new powers, including the ability to sanction NSAs; and third, whether the president communicates a clear interest in
vigorously promoting religious freedom as a foreign policy priority, including
by prioritizing funding for international religious freedom promotion activities
and instituting meaningful sanctions against designated CPCs and EPCs.
Successfully effectuating change across these elements will hinge at
least in part on the role played by human rights and religious freedom activists.
In regard to this latter point, the Wolf Act provides several ready yardsticks
that may prove useful for measuring the extent to which any of its changes are
impacting the promotion of international religious freedom. Moving forward,
scholars, activists and policymakers alike can turn their attention to assessing,
for example: the scope and nature of funding afforded to international religious
freedom activities; the extent of the IRF Ambassador’s inclusion in the policymaking process; the timing and substance of CPC and EPC designation
processes, including the types of action taken; the countries that are added to
the Special Watch List, the nature of engagement that follows, and the duration
of their designation as such; the content and execution of the State Department’s religious freedom training curriculum; the timely and consistent release
of the Designated Persons List; and the ongoing interaction between the State
Department and USCIRF, including the status of the Commission’s future
reauthorization. These metrics should serve as revealing bellwethers of where
international religious freedom promotion is headed in a post-Wolf Act era. As
such, they will also attest to whether the Wolf Act has truly served to
“strengthen[] and modernize[]” IRFA “and promote and advance the universal
human right of religious freedom around the world,”224 or whether another
effort on the part of Congress will be required.225
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